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Abstract
The growth rate of chief executive officers’ (CEOs) compensation has dramatically
outpaced average employees’ pay increases. Scholars have not been able to reach a
consensus on whether the financial performance of firms has a positive influence on
CEOs’ compensation. Also, boards of directors lack a clear understanding of the
relationship between financial performance of firms and CEOs’ incentive compensation
in the U.S. banking industry. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the
predictive relationship between financial performance of firms (measured by return on
equity [ROE] and annual revenue) and CEOs’ total compensation in the U.S. banking
industry. According to agency theory, which was the theoretical framework for this
study, failing to understand such a relationship could cause a misalignment between
CEOs’ compensation and the performance of firms. Hence, the research question was,
does a predictive relationship exist between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’
total compensation? Archival data from publicly traded U.S. banking firms were
collected and analyzed. Multiple regression techniques were used to identify a
statistically significant predictive model, F (2, 121) = 95.691, p < .000, R2 = .613.
Changes in annual revenue were found to be significantly more sensitive than changes of
ROE relative to the impact on changes in CEOs’ total compensation. This study may
contribute to positive social change by raising individuals’ awareness of the importance
of maintaining CEOs’ equitable compensation. Additionally, compensation committees
of banking firms can use the findings from this study to evaluate their compensation
strategies and make necessary adjustments.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
The average compensation for U.S. chief executive officers (CEOs) of Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies rose by more than 300% from the 1990s to the 2010s
(Shue & Townsend, 2017). This trend in CEO compensation might be a reflection of the
growth in profits of firms. In this study I evaluated, using a quantitative correlational
design, the predictive relationship between firms’ return on equity (ROE), their annual
revenues, and CEOs’ total compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in
stock, and bonuses in options). The results of this study could add to the existing body of
knowledge on the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and the financial
performance of the firms that employ them.
Background of the Problem
The dramatic increase in CEOs’ compensation might not align with the financial
performance of the firms that employ them. Results of previous studies on the
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation have been varied. For
instance, Nulla (2013b) found that CEOs’ total compensation and the financial
performance of the firms that employed them were positively related in the financial
service industry. However, Lin, Kuo, and Wang (2013) found that there was a negative
relationship in other industries.
Boards of directors (BODs) of companies appoint CEOs with the objective of
maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Iqbal & Javed, 2017). However, CEOs might act in
their own interests rather than that of their shareholders, if BODs fail to govern CEOs’
job performance by making compensation contingent on firm performance (Okoth &
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Coşkun, 2016). As Nulla (2013a) noted, some BODs might not have a compensation
structure in place to align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders.
BODs might include incentive mechanisms in CEOs’ compensation packages,
which are often composed of cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options in
addition to salaries (Rau, 2017). On the other hand, shareholders’ interests depend on the
financial performance of the firms in which they hold stock, where financial performance
can be the measurements of ROE and annual revenue (Okoth & Coşkun, 2016). Using a
statistical model might provide helpful findings about the predictive relationship between
the financial performance of firms and CEOs’ total compensation. Such findings might
also provide supportive information for BODs to use in considering their CEOs’
incentives as a part of corporate governance.
Problem Statement
CEOs’ compensation is inseparably tied to firm performance in U.S.-based banks,
which implies that CEOs should receive reduced compensation when their firms
experience negative market returns (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). During the 2006–2008
financial crisis, more than 50% of the U.S. banking CEOs lost their incentive
compensation (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). The general problem is that some firms in the
banking industry might not maintain an effective structure for CEOs’ compensation,
which could result in conflicts of interests between CEOs and their shareholders. The
specific problem is that BODs of some U.S. banks lack an understanding of the predictive
relationship between ROE, annual revenue of the firm, and the CEO’s total
compensation.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the predictive
relationship between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation. The
independent variables (predictors) were ROE of the firm and annual revenue of the firm.
The dependent variable (criterion) was CEO’s total compensation. Archival data for U.S.
publicly traded banks from 2010 to 2015 were used to quantify the predictor variables
and the criterion variable. Data were available in firm-year format.
This study may contribute to social change by providing new information that
could assist members of BODs regarding decisions to incentivize CEOs, such as
including various types of bonuses in CEOs’ compensation packages. Misalignment
between CEOs’ compensation and the performance of firms may be of concern to the
public (Nulla, 2013b). However, the public and the other stakeholders might have limited
awareness about the extent to which such a misalignment may have a negative impact on
financial performance of the firm. This study could lead BODs to a better understanding
of how firms’ financial performance should affect CEOs’ compensation, which may
contribute to improved public perception.
Nature of the Study
I determined that a quantitative methodology was appropriate for examining the
relationship between the predictor variables and the criterion variable. Quantitative
researchers seek to understand and generalize a phenomenon by testing numerical data,
measuring variables, and building statistical models (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015).
Guetterman, Fetters, and Creswell (2015) asserted that qualitative researchers, instead,
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focus on developing a theory, understanding individuals’ experiences, or exploring a
phenomenon. However, the focus of this study was on the empirical examination of the
relationship between predictor variables and criterion variable. Because qualitative study
does not involve use of a statistical approach to examine the relationship between
variables (Birchall, Murphy, & Milne, 2016), I concluded that a qualitative method was
not appropriate for my investigation.
In addition to choosing a method, researchers need to decide on the strategies of
inquiry within a research methodology, which is the research design (Wilson, 2016). I
determined that a quantitative correlational design was the most suitable one for this
study. A correlational design, which is nonexperimental in nature, allows researchers to
establish the relationship between variables without any manipulation (Hughes, Matt, &
O’Reilly, 2015). True experimental and quasi-experimental designs were not appropriate
for this study because they are used for assessing cause-and-effect relationships (van
Loon, de Bruin, van Gog, van Merrienboer, & Dunlosky, 2014). Using a causalcomparative design, a researcher examines a causal factor and compares differences
between variables (Bonita et al., 2014; Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014). The
focus of this study was on examining the relationship between the variables of interest
rather than determining whether they were causally related to one another. A descriptive
design is more suited to providing an overview of the relationship between variables than
a detailed investigation of the relationship (Oh & Gastmans, 2015).
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Research Question
Does a predictive relationship exist between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and
CEOs’ total compensation?
Hypotheses
H0: A significant predictive relationship does not exist between the ROE of firms,
annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking
industry.
Ha: A significant predictive relationship exists between the ROE of firms, annual
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking industry.
Theoretical Framework
Agency theory provided the framework for this study. This theory stems from the
work of Berle and Means (1932), who observed that leaders of modern companies often
separate ownership from operational control. This separation of ownership from control
resulted in the principal-agent relationship, where managers, as agents of the
organization, perform actions in the best interests of the owners (principals; Berle &
Means, 1932). However, agency theory also relates to the assumption of the economic
man, an imaginary figure who can act rationally for the optimization of self-interests
(Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Mitnick (2015) expanded agency theory by arguing that a CEO
of a firm who might pursue his or her own benefits over those of the firm if performance
of the firm and the CEO’s incentives are not aligned. Eisenhardt (1989) stated that the
assumptions of agency theory had two fundamental tenets: the conflict of interest
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between the principal and the agent, and the information asymmetry between both
parties.
Agency theory was applicable to this study because my focus was on finding the
relationship between the best interests of CEOs and those of firms. I surmised that
bonuses in CEO compensation might be considered the incentive in the principal-agent
relationship and might encourage managers to work harder to improve performance of
their firms. Jensen and Mecking (1976) identified the cost of monitoring the CEO’s
performance as the agency cost and further suggested that organizations—or their
BODs—should have strong incentive mechanisms in place for individuals to minimize
agency cost. Hence, the CEOs’ self-interests (the compensation received from the
company) and the owners’ best interests (performance of the firm) need to achieve
consistent alignment.
In the present study, CEO’s compensation was a straightforward measurement
(the criterion variable), whereas ROE and annual sales revenue were the indicators (the
predictor variables) for performance of the firm. I used relevant data as the measurements
of CEO’s compensation and performance of the firm. The theoretically expected
relationship, namely higher compensation of a CEO, might lead to better performance of
a firm.
Operational Definitions
Annual revenue: The amount of money that a company receives from sales per
year (Benedettini, Neely, & Swink, 2015).
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Bonus in stock: The amount of payment in addition to the salary that a person
receives in the form of company’s stock (Paz & Griffin, 2014).
Bonus in option: The rewarding privilege in addition to the salary that a person
receives in the form of company’s stock option grant (Paz & Griffin, 2014).
Cash bonus: The amount of money paid in addition to the salary that a person
receives (Paz & Griffin, 2014).
CEO total compensation: The sum of salary, cash bonus, and non-cash bonuses
that a CEO receives (Paz & Griffin, 2014).
Non-cash bonus: The amount of payment in addition to the salary that a person
receives in forms other than money (Samina & Zaman, 2015).
Return on equity: The result of aftertax profit divided by stockholders’ equity
(Masum, 2014), or the ratio of net income and net assets, which serves as a measurement
of how much profit shareholders receive on their investments (Pletzer, Nikolova,
Kedzior, & Voelpel, 2015).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Assumptions are facts that, while considered to be true, have not gone through a
verification process (Wohlin & Aurum, 2015). Unverified information assumed to be true
can include the supporting theory of the study being invalid or still under investigation
and the methodology used being ineffective for this study. In this study, I assumed that
the data collected from annual reports regarding the financial performance of firms were
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accurate, as were data collected from archival databases containing the CEOs’
compensation.
Limitations
Limitations are potential weaknesses of the study that are mostly out of the
researcher’s control (Cunha & Miller, 2014; Green, Tonidandel, & Cortina, 2016). The
limitations for this study were that the target population included only publicly listed
banks in the United States and data collected spanned years 2010 to 2015. Hence, the
results might not be valid for other industries or time periods. Also, I used archival data
for the study. Other researchers might achieve different results if they perform a similar
evaluation using a different type of data collection method. Lastly, stakeholders in the
banking industry might interpret these results differently.
Delimitations
Delimitations of a study are actions that researchers decide not to perform because
of the scope or boundaries of the study (Domingos et al., 2014; Newcomer, Marion, &
Earnhardt, 2014). The two predictor variables in this study were potentially correlated,
which might have had an impact on results of the study. I proceeded with the study, being
aware of the risks of yielding poor results if multicollinearity occurred in the data
analysis process. However, I was prepared to address the matter if the results were poor
when the data analysis procedures were complete. The delimitations of this study were as
follows: I did not extend the inquiry into components of corporate governance other than
CEOs’ compensation. The examination was only of publicly traded U.S.-based banks; I
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did not include privately held banking corporations in the study. Also, I only used two
forms of measurements for organizational financial performance.
Significance of the Study
Contribution to Business Practice
Although CEOs’ compensation has attracted much attention among financial
researchers, BODs of companies still lacked an understanding of the relationship between
CEOs’ compensation and financial performance of firms (Lin et al., 2013). Prior
researchers have had mixed results in examining this relationship in other industries. Lin
et al. (2013) were not able to identify a general relationship across 10 different industries.
Nulla (2013b), however, found a positive relationship within the financial service
industry. In this study, I examined the U.S. banking industry to address a gap in business
practice revealed in the literature I reviewed.
The results of the study may effectively contribute to business practice by
increasing knowledge about the connection between CEOs’ compensation and financial
performance of public banking firms in the United States. Lin et al. (2013) found,
through an examination of this relationship, that business practices are enhanced by
adopting a strategic and fair CEOs’ compensation structure that links to the performance
of firms. Additionally, BODs of companies can better understand the importance of
having strategies for developing efficient CEO compensation structures. BODs might be
more confident in monitoring the performance of firms on behalf of their shareholders
than before (Lin et al., 2013).
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Implications for Social Change
The results of this study carry a positive implication for social change by
potentially raising the level of public awareness regarding the risks associated with
misalignment between performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. Banking industry
stakeholders did not possess a clear understanding of the risks associated with the
possible mismatches between CEOs’ compensation and performance of firms (Cerasi &
Oliviero, 2015). The public might gain insight about how to address their concerns about
performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. Members of BODs might not understand
the risks and costs associated with CEOs’ decisions on behalf of the companies without
proper incentive mechanisms (Mitnick, 2015). Therefore, this study may be useful to
both organizations in the public banking industry and to society.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
A review of the professional and academic literature involved an in-depth inquiry
into various sources, such as academic journals, technical and research reports,
publications of professional affiliations, seminal work, and scholarly books. My initial
search yielded more than 600 articles on research methods, theoretical framework,
financial performance of firms, and CEOs’ compensation. Then, I shifted my focus to
financial, economic, and managerial journals, which resulted the inclusion of 88 articles
from journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Annual Review of Financial
Economics, Financial Management, International Review of Finance, Journal of
Accounting and Finance, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Review of Quantitative

11
Finance and Accounting, Journal of Banking & Finance, The Journal of Finance, and
Journal of Organizational Behavior.
My strategy for searching the literature began with the keywords and phrases,
CEOs’ compensation and financial performance of firms. I then searched for literature on
my theoretical framework by using the key phrase, agency theory. An additional search
included a combination of the following keywords: banking industry, executive
compensation, corporate governance, executive compensation structure, and corporate
performance. In conducting my search, I used a few filtering techniques to ensure the
relevance and currency of the literature. These filters consisted of the following: selecting
the publication year to be older than 2013; excluding journals that were not peerreviewed; and excluding articles from fields other than finance, management, or
economics.
In searching for literature, I used Walden University Library databases, Google
Scholar (using the citation chaining function), Social Science Research Network
database, Education Resources Information Center database, U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, and Amercian Bankers Association. As a result, the literature review included
95 sources, of which more than 85% were peer-reviewed with publication dates less than
5 years old (see Table 1; also see Appendix A for a breakdown of the frequency and
percentage of all sources used in the study).
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Table 1
Frequency and Percentage of Sources Used in the Study
References
Resources
N
%
< 5 years old
6 + years old
Peer reviewed articles
82
8
90
94.7
Other journal articles
4
4
Books
1
1
Total
86
9
95
90.5
Note. Articles from peer-reviewed journals which were published in the past 5 years
constituted 86.3% of the total sources.
This review of the literature is organized according to the following four sections.
The first part is a restatement of the purpose statement of the study and hypotheses to
remind the reader of the intended examination. I then present an analysis of the literature
regarding my theoretical framework to provide context for the examination. Next is an
analysis of the predictor variables of ROE of the firm and annual revenues of the firm, as
well as the synthesized literature on these measurements. The last section is a review of
the literature pertaining to the criterion variable of CEO’s compensation and the literature
on its measurement.
Application to the Applied Business Problem
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the predictive
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options).
The predictor variables were ROE of the firm and annual revenue of the firm. The
criterion variable was CEO’s total compensation. Archival data for U.S. publicly traded
banks from 2010 to 2015 were used to quantify both the predictor variables and the
criterion variable. The examination was based upon the following hypotheses:
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H0: A significant predictive relationship does not exist between ROE of firms,
annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking
industry.
Ha: A significant predictive relationship exists between ROE of firms, annual
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking industry.
Literature on Agency Theory
Agency theory originated from the work of Berle and Means in 1932, who stated
that modern companies often have the separated ownership from operational control,
which represent the principal-agent relationship. Berle and Means (1932) evaluated the
200 largest U.S.-based nonfinancial firms in 1929 in their quantitative study and found
that 44% did not have any individual ownership interest. Most companies owned 20% of
their stock—a share Berle and Means perceived was also at an approximately minimum
level—which indicated that the companies needed to attain control of operation.
Managers, as the agents, perform actions in the best interests of owners (principals),
according to Berle and Means. However, agency theory also relates to the assumption of
economic man, an imaginary figure who can act rationally for the optimization of selfinterests (Bosse & Phillips, 2016).
Eisenhardt (1989) stated that agency theory had two fundamental tenets: (a) a
conflict of interest between principal and agent and (b) information asymmetry between
both parties. The agent may also be the shareholder of the firm, who will likely act on
maximizing the value of the firm (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Berle and Means (1932) then
analyzed and categorized 88 firms that owned 58% of the total assets among the top 200
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management-controlled ones. Of these, in only 11% of firms did owners possess a
majority of the firms’ shares.
Mitnick (2015) studied the origins of agency theory and found that CEOs might
pursue their own interests if they perceived that their incentives did not align with
performance of firms. Balafas and Florackis (2014) used this theory to examine the
effects of CEO compensation on shareholder value by comparing firms that provided
their CEOs with excessive fees and other firms in the same industry that did not provide
their CEO with excessive fees. Using data from a large sample of U.K.-listed companies
for the period of 1998–2010, Balafas and Florackis found that higher CEO compensation
could lead to lower subsequent short-term returns, whereas firms that provided CEOs
with low incentive distribution experienced the opposite.
Jensen and Mecking (1976) integrated various components of the theory of
property rights, the theory of agency, and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the
ownership structure for a firm, which aims to determine the firm’s equity and debt. Using
agency theory, Brisker, Colak, and Peterson (2014) found that owners experienced
information gaps in the external environment, market trends, and actual business
situations of their firms because they were not engaged in the specific business activities
of their firms. To counter the effects of these information gaps, Bosse and Phillips (2016)
suggested that the principal need to employ a monitoring mechanism on the agent’s
performance.
Jensen and Mecking (1976) began by defining the meaning of agency costs. Next,
they determined the relationship between the issue of separation and control from the
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perspective of agency costs. Finally, Jensen and Mecking clarified the nature of the
agency costs caused by outside equity and debt. They used the theory of ownership
structure to identify the agency cost as the cost of monitoring CEO performance, and
concluded that firms should develop strong incentives programs to minimize agency cost
(Jensen & Mecking, 1976). Brisker et al. (2014) hypothesized that executives whose
compensation was highly equity-based were motivated to avoid ownership dilution by
timing their seasonal equity offers to periods when investors in the firm could
temporarily overprice their stocks. A mere 1% change in stock price can lead to
significant changes in executives’ wealth.
Aided by agency theory, Brisker et al. (2014) found that CEOs of firms with
relatively high compensation experienced abnormally low stock returns and unfavorable
changes in operational performance in the 3 years following the change in stock price. In
general, the findings led Brisker et al. to conclude that principals sought wealth
maximization while agents strove for benefit maximization, a mismatch that could create
inevitable conflicts of interest between the two groups. The firms that experienced
positive abnormal returns outperformed firms where CEOs received compensation at the
top of the incentive compensation distribution (Balafas & Florackis, 2014). Higher
incentive pay also led to lower future operating performance. The development of social
productivity and the continuous expansion of production scale might affect the principalagent relationship (Balafas & Florackis, 2014). In the contemporary corporate
environment, information asymmetry between owners of firms (principals) and managers
(agents) can negatively affect the relationship (Balafas & Florackis, 2014).
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Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011) investigated incentive system designs in firms in
France and Canada using agency theory with a particular focus on the relationships
between the characteristics of BODs and earnings management (a proxy of earnings
quality). Through performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDA), Jouber and
Fakhfakh carried out three separate regressions on a full sample consisting of a French
subsample and a Canadian subsample to determine institutional features and BOD
characteristics that can affect PMDA. Jouber (2016) investigated how CEOs’ pay relative
to firm performance compensation schemes might align with the executives’ incentives.
By using a quantitative logit and stepwise regression design, Jouber collected sample data
of executive compensation for 231 publicly traded companies in Canada, France, United
Kingdom, and the United States over the period of 2004–2008.
Through a regression analysis on panel data of 180 French and Canadian listed
firms from 2006 to 2008, Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011) investigated the impact of
institutional features on the behavior of earnings management, which were the strongest
incentives to management discretion through a PMDA. They conducted three separate
panel regressions to determine the effects of board characteristics and institutional
features on the PMDA. Jouber (2016) found that pay-to-performance incentives were
likely favorable to shareholders because these schemes tended to contribute to value
creation for the firm.
Further, the effects on long-term total shareholder returns were not unanimously
applicable to all firms; companies that experienced growth would have higher market
value in the future (Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2011). CEOs’ pay for performance incentives
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served the interests of shareholders by creating value for the firms (Jouber, 2016). Results
of Jouber’s study were the same as those reported earlier by Jouber and Fakhfakh
regarding the effects of incentives on long-term total shareholder returns, but Jouber also
found higher quality corporate governance of executive compensation affected the level
of investors’ protection.
The uncertainty of current investment income compounds the difficulties of
measuring performance of agents (Banker, Darrough, Rong & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013).
Banker et al. developed a two-period principal-agent model to test their theoretical
predictions utilizing CEO compensation data collected from the period of 1993–2006. On
the other hand, Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, and Carpenter (2010) applied agency theory to
their meta-analysis of existing literature by examining the relationship between CEOs’
compensation and the financial performance of firms.
Banker et al. (2013) found BODs of growth companies tended to raise the
proportion of equity earnings in CEOs’ compensation structure to reduce agency costs.
The nature of investment opportunities also affects executive compensation structure.
Investment or investment opportunities that were more uncertain and needed more time
to succeed were more likely to be associated with potential proxy conflicts (Banker et al.,
2013). Nyberg et al. (2010) concluded the quality of the primary data, an emphasis on
equity-based compensation, and the mismatch of short-term or long-term incentives were
limitations to applicability of agency theory. Based on the reconceptualization of CEOs’
compensation to CEOs’ return, Nyberg et al. discovered a stronger alignment of CEOs’
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compensation and shareholders’ interests than had been reported in the previous
literature.
Pandher and Currie (2013) conducted a quantitative correlational study examining
how CEOs’ compensation and compensation composition can be strategic factors in the
capacity of firms to generate value, the uncertainty of resource advantage, and the
competitive interaction of the firm stakeholders with their top executives. Pandher and
Currie used an analytical framework wherein CEOs and stakeholders pressed for the
surplus of firms as utility-maximizing claimants according to their bargaining power,
while providing shareholders with market-based returns. Pandher and Currie found that
executives were self-serving and might not act in shareholders’ best interests to maximize
profits for the firm, which agreed with the findings reported by Nyberg et al. (2010).
In a mixed-methods study, Larkin, Pierce, and Gino (2012) focused on the
psychological cost of nonexecutive compensation to analyze agency theory by
investigating the pay-to-performance system from a different perspective. Larkin et al.
first conducted a qualitative case study using the survey and interview instruments on
data of selected firms in California. Next, they examined how psychological costs from
overconfidence and social comparison can lead to reductions in the accuracy of
individual performance-based compensation by using a quantitative cause-and-effect
analysis design. Larkin et al. found that compensation was a strategic motivator for
workers, which could also lead to overall better productivity and firm performance.
Therefore, the results of Larkin et al. and Pandher and Currie (2013)’s study were
coincided.

19
Larkin et al. (2012) concluded that even though agency theory provides a
framework for the development of compensation strategies, the theory fails to take into
account several psychological factors that can improve costs of performance-based
compensation. The researchers argued that performance-based pay increases agent costs
because of psychological costs such as social comparison and overconfidence (Larkin et
al., 2012; Pandher & Currie, 2013). Therefore, Larkin et al. proposed better compensation
options that were team-based, seniority-based, or flatter compensation. However, the use
of compensation systems might have strategic significance for corporations. Larkin et al.
pointed out the limitation of the agency theory was disregarding the strategic effects of
compensation systems.
Other researchers’ findings were different from those of Larkin et al. (2012)
regarding the value of agency theory. For example, Cao and Wang (2013) conducted a
mixed-methods study by integrating agency theory into search theory to examine
executive compensation in market equilibrium. They analyzed the optimal contracting
strategy of individual firms under arbitrarily fixed outside options for CEOs, where a
CEO can choose to stay or quit after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the
firm. Then, the authors explored the relationship between the risk level of the firm and
the optimal pay-to-performance ratio (Cao & Wang, 2013). Cao and Wang tested on a
sample of 1,890 firms and 3,181 CEOs with data from ExecuComp database for the
period of 1992–2009. They found that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio was less than
1, even when the CEO was risk-neutral, and that the equilibrium pay-to-performance
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sensitivity depended positively on the idiosyncratic risk of the firm and negatively on the
systematic risk (Cao & Wang, 2013).
Chakravarty and Grewal (2016) used agency theory as the theoretical framework
in their quantitative study to analyze a combination of ExecuComp, Capital IQ, and
Kantar Media Intelligence on 515 firms during the period of 2001–2009. Chakravarty and
Grewal suggested that granting more stock options and restricted stocks could mitigate
CEO’s short-term disincentives and, in return, encourage CEOs to invest more in
advertisement and research and development (R&D). Liao and Lin (2017) studied how
R&D investments of firms might have an impact on firm performance and found a
positive relationship in between. Therefore, the spending on R&D and advertising
mediated the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and performance (book value,
sales, dividend payout, and return on assets [ROA] of firms in the given study;
Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016).
R&D spending also provided disincentives for the CEOs; these disincentives
could create the problems such as earnings expectation to the subsequent analysts’
anticipation, declining sales, worse economic conditions, and limited tenure in the firm
(Chen, Ho, & Ho, 2014). The risk compensation would have a direct impact on agents’
decisions that involve capital investment, R&D expenses, and corporate diversification
(Chen, Ho, et al., 2014). In contrast to Chen, Ho, et al., Chakravarty and Grewal (2016)
suggested that if CEOs’ compensation were set according to long-term scope, the CEOs
would act in the best interests of long-term goals and perform more risk-taking behaviors.
Furthermore, the effects would be larger in smaller firms because larger companies are
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not likely to improve the equity-to-bonus ratio on a large scale. Therefore, the research
was consistent with agency theory, indicating CEOs’ compensation aligned with
performance of firms from a long-term perspective (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016).
Review of Relevant Literature on Predictor Variables
Return on equity. Analysts utilize performance measures to determine how well
a profit-seeking organization is faring; ROE is one of the strongest predictors (Ahsan,
2013). In a quantitative study, Samad (2015) described ROE as one of the most important
ratios for investors to check. This indicator is quite popular among analysts, financial
managers, and shareholders because it represents the outcome of DuPont analysis, which
is a widely used financial ratio analysis (Samad, 2015). Ahsan, as part of a literature
synthesis review, evaluated why financial managers, analysts, and researchers seek to
determine the value of a company through traditional measurements such as earnings per
share, returns on assets, and dividends per share. Ahsan designed a quantitative
correlational study to determine why experts described ROE as one of the most
commonly used indicators for firms to gauge their performance based on the assumption
of given fixed assets, net working capital, equity, and tax rates. Ahsan found that ROE
was an appealing measurement for analysts because it links the income statement to the
balance statement.
Earnings ratio is related to equity ratio. However, studies later revealed that
serious flaws existed in using ROE as a measure of firm performance. One of the main
limitations was that earnings are a manipulatable factor, even in a legal way (Ahsan,
2013). Changes in accounting policies within the framework of generally accepted
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accounting principles (GAAP) can also lead to changes in earnings (Ahsan, 2013).
Rappaport (1986) indicated that asset turnover, or the second component of ROE, can be
vulnerable to inflation. Asset turnover and ROE can increase due to inflation, but not due
to the performance of the firm, which might increase even if assets are not being utilized
effectively. Rappaport also found that in the 1970s, even though the earnings of S&P 500
companies decreased drastically, ROEs of firms still increased because of significant
financial padding and increased levels of asset turnover. While the firms appeared as if
they were performing well because of their increased ROEs, their market returns were
poor (Rappaport, 1986).
Another flaw is that computation of ROE is often made after the cost of debt, but
before considering the cost of capital. If capital gearing increased, ROE would increase
as well just because returns earned on the borrowed money are still higher than the cost
of borrowings (Ahsan, 2013). However, this argument is not an accurate picture of the
value of the firm because increasing debts or capital gearing beyond a specific level can
also lead to the devaluation of the company and the share price to decrease (Ahsan,
2013). Xing, Howe, and Anderson (2017) asserted that ROE was a short-term indicator to
boost the perceived annual performance of a firm. Pursuing higher ROE through
increased capital gearing can lead to wealth destruction (Ahsan, 2013).
ROE is the calculation of profit after tax and preference dividends of a specific
year, divided by the book value of equity at the start of the year, which consists of issued
ordinary share capital in addition to the share premium and reserves (Xing et al, 2017).
Average equity can also be used for the computation (Ahsan, 2013, Xing et al., 2017).
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Ahsan stated that ROE is composed of three ratios: (a) profitability ratio, (b) asset
turnover ratio, and (c) financial leverage. ROE increases or improves if one of these
ratios also improves (Ahsan, 2013). If profitability, which is earnings divided by sales
improves, the ROE can improve. If assets usage is efficient while financial leverage
increases, the same effect could happen. Over time, however, studies revealed that
improving ROE does not equate to higher shareholder value (Ahsan, 2013).
Annual revenue. Annual revenue is a strong indicator of firm growth. Revenue
growth is a sign that a company is performing well (Feng, Morgan, & Reco, 2017).
According to Feng et al., present value (PV) of a firm is the PV from expected cash flows
to be generated by the firm in the future. The most important input in valuation,
especially for the firms in a high-growing industry, is the growth rate to predict future
revenue and earnings (Feng et al., 2017; Xing et al., 2017).
Growth in revenue tends to be more persistent than growth in earnings, which are
also much more predictable than growth in earnings (Feng et al., 2017; Xing et al., 2017).
Accounting choices often have less impact on annual revenue than on annual earnings,
which applies specifically to technology firms because their executives exercise more
discretion when deciding on R&D spending (Xing et al., 2017). Therefore, the
accountants of firms can just transfer earnings between accounting periods, which is
difficult to do with revenues (Feng et al., 2017).
In addition, revenue growth over time has been found to be consistently correlated
with earnings growth, which makes historical growth in revenues much more useful for
forecasting and analyzing firm performance compared to historical growth in earnings
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(Feng et al., 2017; Xing et al., 2017). Feng et al. found that focusing on revenue growth
instead of earnings growth could better determine the pace of growth. Furthermore, the
momentum of growth could be carried over for the long term (Feng et al., 2017).
Compared to earnings growth, changes in annual revenue are less volatile and not
as easily affected by accounting policy changes (Feng et al., 2017). Annual revenue
changes could determine effects of changes in firm size, which could also be a more
accurate measurement for making projections for the future (Feng et al., 2017; Xing et
al., 2017). To calculate annual revenue, the firm relies on the computation of the amount
of money received in exchange for goods and services. Annual revenue is important for
analyzing and measuring financial ratios, such as gross margin and gross margin
percentage (Feng et al., 2017).
Review of Relevant Literature on Criterion Variable
Executive compensation. CEOs provide management services to the
organization in return for compensation. Executive compensation committees established
the ownership of firms determine CEOs’ compensation program based on the need to
retain executives and maintain continuity in leadership (Veliyath, George, Ye,
Hermanson, & Tompkins, 2016). Compensation committees originally developed
compensation packages as a method of competing for managerial talent within the open
market and ensuring that organizations could compete for scarce talents (Veliyath et al.,
2016). Over time, CEOs’ compensations have increased with the size of the organization,
and the complexity and scarcity of skill sets catalyzed the demand of CEOs (Nickerson,
2017).
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Executive compensation includes basic annual salary, bonus, and future contract
(DeYoung, Peng, & Yan, 2013). Among these types of compensation, the basic annual
salary is a fixed compensation, which is independent of the business performance of the
firm, whereas executive bonuses have a significant positive correlation with the business
performance of the firm (DeYoung et al., 2013). CEOs’ forward contracts typically
appear in the form of stock awards or grants to stock options that could be redeemed as
actual cash rewards after a certain period (Bettis, Bizjak, & Kalpathy, 2015). To measure
CEO compensation, corporations have formed a compensation structure in business
practice; this structure uses a combination of cash, options, restricted stock, and other
bonuses (Rau, 2017). Executive compensation could be categorized into following types
(a) short-term income, (b) long-term income, and (c) deferred incentive income, which
specifically includes (a) base salary, (b) bonus, (c) stock, (d) stock options, and (e) other
forms (Shan & Walter, 2016; Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014).
Increasing the proportion of equity earnings, such as the proportion of stock
options in the compensation structure, could effectively integrate the long-term benefits
of the company with the CEOs’ personal interests, thereby helping to enhance the value
of the company (Ju, Leland, & Senbet, 2014). Performance-based income (bonuses) is an
essential variable for motivating agents, which could also affect the growth of enterprises
(Indjejikian, Matejka, Merchant, & Van der Stede, 2014). Increasing risk might create
changes in wealth that might occur as a result of changes in the value of the firm (Ju et
al., 2014). As CEOs’ compensation in the form of stock options increases, risk taking
might also increase due to the potential for upside return in stock options, but a set floor
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for losses (Tosun, 2016). While stock returns for the investor (stockholder) are crucial,
these returns are also forward-looking and reflect the investors’ future expectations of
stock price (Banker et al., 2013). Specifically, debt levels for firms decrease as a CEO’s
stock options as a proportion to pay increase (Tosun, 2016).
The design of CEOs’ compensation structure should satisfy the following two
conditions: (a) include adequate risk income in the incentive structure of executives; and
(b) carry out effective supervision for executives to reduce the cost of risk (Brisker et al.,
2014). Gaertner (2014) examined the role of CEO compensation in tax risk to firms by
analyzing the relationship between aftertax CEO incentives and effective tax rate (ETR).
Gaertner found a negative association between aftertax CEO incentives and ETR. Based
on that finding, Gaertner concluded that CEO incentives, as well as the bonus, are an
effective tool for mitigating tax risks by minimizing tax exposure. Furthermore, CEO’s
aftertax incentives are positively associated with cash compensation and aftertax savings
(Gaertner, 2014). Therefore, Gaertner suggested that the result is consistent with the
economic theory that additional tax-related compensation risk should have the
proportionally incremental compensation.
Determinants of executive compensation. Many factors determine the level of
executive compensation within a company. The executive board establishes executive
compensation and selects individuals to serve in the position of CEO. Liu, Liu, and Diaz
(2016) examined how larger firms with stricter disclosure rules can affect CEO
compensation. Liu et al. found that increasing CEO compensation is the result of stricter
monitoring of the chief executive and institutional shareholders of corporate stock.
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Institutional shareholders and outside directors comprise most executive boards and are
responsible for monitoring the CEOs’ compensation and performance of the firm (Liu et
al., 2016). Corporate consultants recommend that executive compensation originates with
rewards, which provide an increase in wealth based on stock appreciation of the company
(Kaplan & Minton, 2012). By using the option of awarding stock options, BODs can
create rewards and incentives that not only align the interests of shareholders and CEOs,
but also create a financial reward for improved performance (Kaplan & Minton, 2012).
Kaplan and Minton (2012) evaluated trends in CEOs’ compensation from 1992 to
2007 among large U.S. companies and found an explanation for trends in CEOs’
turnover. They found the annual turnover of CEOs was higher than the estimates from
previous studies of earlier periods. Kaplan and Minton asserted that CEOs’ compensation
greatly determined the turnover rate. Since the 1970s, institutional ownership and outside
directors serving on executive compensation boards have increased, as has turnover of
CEOs (Kaplan & Minton, 2012). However, BODs must remain independent to create
alignment with equity incentives (Laux, 2015). Laux determined that when compensation
committees had a higher proportion of nonexecutives as members, CEO salary
compensation was lower, but equity compensation was higher. Because the use of stock
options provides an alignment with the performance of the firm, corporate boards must
ensure that compensation committees have fewer executive members, which increases
the use of equity compensation (Laux, 2015).
CEOs may also receive salaries and bonuses based on their past performance
(Banker et al., 2013). Cremers and Grinstein (2014) analyzed the variation of CEO
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compensation practices and relevant controversy from the perspective of the market for
CEO talent. The authors followed a quantitative correlational design to examine the
relationship between CEOs’ compensation benchmarking, pay-for-luck, and the structure
of the CEO talent pool by collecting data from ExecuComp and Compustat databases
(Cremers & Grinstein, 2014). To measure the variables, Cremers and Grinstein used the
control variables of performance measures (including ROE from the previous year,
changes in the log of shareholder value from the previous year, and growth in the log of
sales) and CEOs’ tenure, as well as the independent variable of the percentage for CEOs’
appointments within the same industry. Cremers and Grinstein found that only CEOs’
compensation had benchmarks against the firms in industries that did not require firmspecific CEO talent, where pay-for-luck was another popular practice that has asymmetry
between compensation and performance. However, the CEOs’ compensation packages
did not rely on whether the CEOs had firm-specific talent (Cremers & Grinstein, 2014).
Cremers and Grinstein (2014) concluded that the structure of the CEO talent pool
was related to marginal decisions on CEO compensation (benchmarking and pay-forluck). No evidence was found to explain increases in overall CEO compensation
(Cremers & Grinstein, 2014). Cremers and Grinstein ascribed these findings to
consistency with theories of the CEO talent market and the argument of CEO talent
competition. In contrast with Cremers and Grinstein’s study, Falato, Li, and Milbourn
(2015) justified the link between the CEOs’ credentials, CEOs’ compensation, and
performance of the firm by statistical analysis of data from the ExecuComp database with
a sample of 2,195 cases of CEO succession from 1993 to 2005, although CEOs’ talent, by
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its very nature, was difficult to quantify. The measurement of CEOs’ credentials referred
to coded proxies on CEOs’ press coverage, trackable career records, and educational
records (Falato et al., 2015). The regression analysis results were twofold: (a) new CEOs
earned as much as 5% of total compensation premium per best decile of credentialholders, of which were from CEOs with good credentials in relatively large firms; (b)
CEOs with better credentials had significantly higher compensation in their first-year
appointments (Falato et al., 2015). Also, the evidence revealed the presence of a
relationship between CEOs’ credentials, CEOs’ compensation, and performance of the
firm (Falato et al., 2015).
On the other hand, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) identified compensation
practices in the banking industry and the associated risks, where the CEOs’ cash bonuses
might introduce the level of default bank risks. Vallascas and Hagendorff conducted a
quantitative correlational study to investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms
embedded in CEOs’ cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. The authors measured the
bank risks via the Merton distance to default (DD) model, which is widely used in
research and commercial applications (Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013; Yeh, 2017). The
DD model measures the default risk as the number of standard deviations the market
value of bank assets lies above default point, which is the point where the market value of
assets is less than the book value of total liabilities (Yeh, 2017). Vallascas and
Hagendorff collected data from U.S. and European banks during the period of 1986–
2008. The results revealed no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk-reducing effect
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when banks were financially distressed, or when banks operated under weak regulatory
regimes (Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013).
Additional factors can affect executive compensation. The components of
executive compensation are a combination of both short-term compensation (salary and
bonuses) and long-term compensation, which typically consists of stock and shares (Cole
& Mehran, 2016; Gabaix, Landier, & Sauvagat, 2014). Cole and Mehran briefly
described the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and performance of the firm.
The goal of an organization is to achieve maximum profit; shareholders and owners get
financial benefits from this profit (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Managers or executives who
are responsible for managing the firm normally focus on self-benefit rather than
shareholders’ or organization interests (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Gabaix et al. suggested
avoiding the issue of self-benefiting by providing attractive compensation and incentives
to executives. For example, by increasing sales or production, executives might claim
more compensation (Gabaix et al., 2014). Therefore, the relationship must depend on
profit-compensation but not on the relationship between high sales or production and
compensation (Cole & Mehran, 2016; Gabaix et al., 2014).
Political and social factors also play important roles in executive compensation.
Executives try to influence political factors to stabilize or increase their compensation
(Cole & Mehran, 2016; Gabaix et al., 2014). Executives’ high salaries and the other
compensation have an impact on the social environment because they lead to inequality
in society because ordinary workers’ payments do not match the compensation of these
executives (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Size of the firm has an impact on executive
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compensation: small firms have a negative impact on executive compensation, whereas
large firms had a positive impact on executive compensation (Gabaix et al., 2014).
Tax reform policies influenced the tax system in terms of capital gains instead of
executive income. Over time, stock options or share-based compensation have increased
at high rates (Gorry, Hassett, Hubbard, & Mathur, 2017). Recent data and reliable
information on stock-based compensation support estimates of an accurate and consistent
relationship between management wealth and firm performance over the long term
(Gorry et al., 2017). Share-based compensation is an essential part of contemporary
compensation packages (Gorry et al., 2017). Long-term incentives should not increase,
but stock or share-based compensation should decrease (Gorry et al., 2017). The need for
uniform and clear pay practices for executives across the market segment emerged.
Recent studies indicated that use of stock-based compensation practice has declined, but
researchers suggested that the executive compensation value, which depends on share and
market segments, has been increasing continuously (Gorry et al., 2017; Usman, Akhter,
& Akhtar, 2015).
Usman et al. (2015) studied the determinants of CEOs’ compensation with a
partial least square (PLS) regression analysis to investigate the effectiveness of BODs on
CEOs’ compensation structure using a sample of companies listed on the Karachi
Pakistan Stock Exchange 100 from 2007 to 2011. Usman et al. used variance inflationary
factor and bootstrapping techniques to verify the proposed model in PLS graph software.
Fralich and Fan (2015) conducted a quantitative analysis to examine investors’ and
executives’ different points of view of the contingency factors of executive compensation
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to reduce agency costs. Their findings revealed CEOs’ social capital has greater
importance to factors correlated with CEOs’ compensation, and little weight on human
capital factors (Fralich & Fan, 2015). By contrast, the findings attached greater
importance to human capital factors influencing executive compensation (Fralich & Fan,
2015). However, Usman et al. failed to find any relationship between BODs’
effectiveness, CEOs’ compensation, and performance of firms; these results were the
implications of the misalignment issue in agency theory. Conclusions of the study
reflected the business environment in Pakistan, where businesses experience poor
corporate governance and concentrated ownership (Usman et al., 2015). Usman et al.
pointed out that their study had a different component of CEOs' total compensation,
which did not include stock options.
Executive compensation varies according to size of the firm, which could be
determined by sales data, assets, and number of workers. Lin et al. (2013) examined the
pay systems of companies that had suffered from fat cat problems of high pay for CEOs.
They defined the fat cat problem as poor CEO performance coupled with high executive
compensation (Lin et al., 2013). Lin et al. used sample data of 903 U.S.-based firms from
2007 to 2010 and found a substitution effect between CEO compensation and the level of
CEO ownership: larger firms granted higher pay to their CEOs. However, when Lin et al.
limited the sample to only fat cat companies, they found a positive association between
tenure and firm size with CEOs’ compensation. In addition, firm size, leverage ratio, and
investment opportunities were significantly associated with total CEO compensation
when the sample was limited to fat cat companies in the financial services industry (Lin
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et al., 2013). Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn (2017), as well as Lin et al. focused on agency
theory, who argued that excessive CEO pay was due to the power of executives over
directors, which also allowed CEOs to set their own compensations and extract payment.
CEOs who have abilities greater than those of average executives receive a larger
compensation package (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012). Managerial power occurs when the
CEOs have the power to extract payment from an organization through direct influence
over the board (Graham et al., 2012). Bebchuck et al. (2011) found that CEO influence
over the board (managerial power) creates pay structures that compensation committees
should control through total executive compensation practices and corporate governance.
Specifically, if a CEO of an organization has enough power over governance to have an
impact on the process of a compensation board when establishing a financial contract,
then measuring pay-for-performance may not be an appropriate method through which to
identify the variables, which make up executive compensation (Bebchuck et al., 2011).
Seo, Tompkins, and Yi (2014) determined that to control the power of the CEO, the
independence of BODs and compensation boards can prevent managers from extracting
payments through higher compensation.
Not all factors that determine executive compensation are financial in nature.
Davila and Venkatachalam (2004) investigated the role of nonfinancial performance
measures in executive compensation. O’Reilly, Caldwell, Chatman, and Doerr (2014)
conducted a quantitative study to examine the relationships between CEOs’ personality,
organizational culture, and performance of the firm. Jouber (2014) conducted a
quantitative correlational study and found that CEO incentives could increase innovation
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within corporations. Nulla (2013a) conducted a quantitative research to investigate the
effect of CEOs’ age on CEOs’ compensation using accounting performance of the firm.
Nulla used data from the S&P database from 2005 to 2010 targeting Canadian
companies.
Davila and Venkatachalam (2004) conducted a quantitative study to explore the
relationship between nonfinancial measures for firms (for example, the passenger load
factor) and CEOs’ cash compensation. They collected data from the EDGAR online
database for 35 airline companies. Davila and Venkatachalam found the existence of a
relationship between the passenger load factor and CEOs’ cash compensation based on
results of the study. However, they found weak evidence that CEOs’ power and financial
performance measures have an impact on the relationship between nonfinancial
performance measures and cash compensation (Davila &Venkatachalam, 2004).
O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al. (2014) conducted a correlational study using two sets of
samples: 56 U.S. publicly traded firms in the technology industry and 44 privately held
Irish firms. They first employed a factor analysis method to identify the organizational
culture and its characteristics on both samples of data, and then tested the hypotheses of
the study using the U.S. portion of the sample data (O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al., 2014). The
measurement of the independent variable was from an organizational culture profilebased Q-sort method containing statements such as fast-moving and being precise, as
well as the Big Five model of CEO personality (O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al., 2014). The
dependent variable was revenue and Tobin's Q, which reflect the present and future cash
flows, respectively (O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al., 2014). Xing et al. (2017) argued that
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Tobin’s Q, as a long-term performance indicator, was better for the purpose valuation
than the traditional accounting terms such as ROE. O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al.’s findings
indicated that CEOs’ personality has a positive effect on organizational culture, which in
turn has an impact on performance of the firm. However, O’Reilly, Caldwell, et al.
suggested further study of the relationships between CEOs’ personality, organizational
culture, and performance of the firm based on more complex profiles.
Innovation often improves in firms that employ more highly compensated CEOs,
which is a positive change for organizational objectives (Laux, 2015). Jouber (2014) used
a Pearson’s correlational design to examine the relationship between the interdependence
of compensation incentives and firm innovation. Results of studies indicated that the type
of incentive (stock options) a compensation committee uses correlates with firm
innovation and growth (Chen, Chen, & Chu, 2014; Jouber, 2014). Specifically, Jouber
found that recent awards and unvested options are more effective in incentivizing CEOs
than previously awarded and vested options. Thus, compensation committees should
continue to utilize stock options to align CEO incentives with those of shareholders
(Chen, Chen, et al., 2014; Jouber, 2014).
Executive compensation in financial crisis. With the early 2000s’ financial
crisis and intense controversy over government bailouts of floundering companies, the
question of executive compensation has again come to the fore of business discourse
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015; Vemala, Nguyen, Nguyen, & Kommasani,
2014). The issue was complex; the AIG bonus scandal became a flashpoint for discussion
about excessive executive compensation and the global economic crisis. AIG, however,
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represented a special case of a company owned essentially by U.S. taxpayers who paid
for executives’ bonuses (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). The fundamental principle
was the same: high levels of executive compensation, if not translated into improved
performance, were a drain on shareholder wealth (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014).
The financial crisis of 2008 exemplified the issue of the drain on shareholder
wealth. The crisis had several different antecedents: reaction of the government to the
savings and loan scandal; federal interest rate policies after the dot-com bubble burst; the
creation and subsequent lack of oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (DeYoung et
al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). A wide range of factors that contributed to the crisis of 2008
made it difficult to gauge the impact of executive compensation accurately. However,
executive compensation schemes played a role in the development of the crisis (DeYoung
et al. 2013; Suárez, 2014).
Flush with cash because of aggressive interest rate cuts by the federal government
after the dot-com bubble burst, banks began to invest aggressively in consumer credit
markets (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). This phenomenon manifested in an
increase in subprime lending. Bank executives were willing to take this risk because they
were confident that these activities would result in increased profits (Suárez, 2014). For a
few years, banks recorded stellar profits and executives cashed in hundreds of millions of
dollars in bonuses, options, and stock compensation (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez,
2014). To ensure maximized profits and minimized risks were achieved, bank executives
packaged their mortgages in mortgage-backed securities (Suárez, 2014). However, bank
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executives advocated at the time that they were offloading some of these subprime loans
(DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014).
Yang, Dolar, and Mo (2014) used a quantitative study to explore the relationship
between CEO compensation and firm performance based on data of 3,286 different firms
and 6,242 different CEOs from the S&P ExecuComp database. Their study was one of
the very few studies that focused on the comparison of the pre- and post- financial crisis
periods in 2007. Yang et al.’s study extended the dimension of similar studies. Yang et al.
found that the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance
demonstrated different patterns between two periods. Based on these different patterns,
they suggested that incentive-based contracts were not effective compensation tools in
the aftermath of the crisis (Yang et al., 2014). Later, Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari (2015) used
data from the Gindex to measure the dependent variable of corporate governance quality
while using CEOs’ age, tenure, and ROE of firms as control variables. The results
showed that CEO compensation was negatively related with a bank taking risks or
becoming a failed institution, for the periods both before and during the financial crisis
(Guo et al., 2015).
Ultimately, executive compensation played only a minor role in the era of
economic crisis (Yang et al., 2014). Bank executives, supplied with stock options, sought
to increase profits. In doing so, they lowered their lending standards too much (DeYoung
et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). The executives were not entirely culpable, though; the federal
government gave them immoderate amount of money to lend (DeYoung et al., 2013;
Suárez, 2014). Bank executives who did not lend the cash available to them were losing
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money; bank executives were inevitably going to find ways to invest, and the demand
was in the mortgage market (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014). Stakeholders
reasonably expected bank executives would have pursued such tactics regardless of the
structure of their compensation packages, especially since they received guidance in that
direction from the Federal Reserve (DeYoung et al., 2013; Suárez, 2014).
The controversy of executive compensation. Elson and Ferrere (2014) argued
that excessive overcompensation departed from optimal market-based contracting, which
originated from the mechanistic and arbitrary application of compensation peer group.
They further pointed out the necessity of internal pay-setting systems to develop
compensation standards based on the individual nature of the organization concerned,
including the CEOs’ current and historical performance, and competitiveness exhibited
by different industries, firms, and business environments (Elson & Ferrere, 2014). Elson
and Ferrere addressed this problem in the context of corporate law, which was different
from most of the work reviewed from an economic perspective. Elson and Ferrere
stressed the importance of pointing out a practical solution to prevent overcompensation
and to better regulate the CEOs. They emphasized the importance of incorporating the
individual characteristics of CEOs (Elson & Ferrere, 2014).
In part, the controversy can be traced to the poor optics that arose when
executives made hundreds or thousands of times more than what their employees made.
The question of an individual’s value was a fair one in this context; the defense was also
reasonable (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015). The market forces of supply and
demand drove the market for executive talent. Generous compensation packages are
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essential for attracting top talent. Without top talent, the company would not meet its
objectives (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015). The issue is also relevant to the
study on corporate governance by Zhu and Westphal (2014). These studies revealed that
no matter how much compensation an executive receives, the structure of the
compensation should align with objectives of the executive team with those of the
shareholders (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Paravisini, 2015; Zhu & Westphal, 2014).
On the other hand, scholars argued executive compensation could be too high and
thus cause a significant burden. In 2006, a survey revealed that 81% of BODs voted that
CEO pay was too high (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). The underlying premise is that executive
pay should be linked to performance. In many cases, the designed constructs justify the
case. The rise in equity-based compensation schemes was primarily due to the belief that
if management had an ownership stake in the firm, the management actions would align
with the other owners’ (shareholders’) objectives (Paz & Zaidi, 2014). The tax structure
at the time—Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement (FASB) No.123—
supported the use of equity-based compensation by providing favorable tax status, which
led to a proliferation of options-based compensation (Paz & Zaidi, 2014). The intent of
options-based compensation was to resolve the agency problem, but ultimately it only
added complexity to the agency problem (Chang, Hayes, & Hillegeist, 2015; Tosun,
2016). In many firms, executives have enough control over their compensation to build in
some distance between their performance and their pay (Chang et al., 2015; Tosun,
2016).
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The objective was to align the interests of management with those of
shareholders, but both options and executive contracts are finite (Cole & Mehran, 2016).
Therefore, the best interests of the executive team were to maximize value in the short
run, to the point of options expiry. So long as the options were in money at the expiry
date, the executives would receive their compensation (Cole & Mehran, 2016). This
argument created a short-term orientation for the executives; while any given shareholder
might hold the security for the short run, the shareholders as a group existed in perpetuity
(Cole & Mehran, 2016). Their interests were for long-term growth and profitability,
which was not congruent with the short-term orientation created using options. Indeed,
some of the major accounting scandals of the early 2000s were driven by this time
orientation conflict (Cole & Mehran, 2016). Members of the FASB recognized the
problem and amended the treatment of equity-based compensation with Statement 123R,
although other firms did not need the FASB to make the call for them (Paz & Zaidi,
2014). Companies such as Berkshire Hathaway have long-eschewed giant executive
payouts; these companies have kept equity-based compensation focused on the long-term
effects (Paz & Zaidi, 2014).
If executives are ignorant of the timing and strike price of their options, they
should be more inclined to pursue the interests of the company, which would lead these
executives to have no sense of urgency to drive up earnings before an expiry date (Neron,
2015). Executives might ultimately receive millions, which would depend strictly on
performance. The temptation to fix earnings would disappear (Neron, 2015). On the other
hand, an abundance of literature exists on the indication of executive compensation not
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being competitive (Neron, 2015; Nickerson, 2017). The first argument that executive
salaries were not too competitive is the free market argument; the market for executive
talent is a free market, which is subject to the laws of demand and supply; the market
participants might determine executive compensation (Nickerson, 2017). The factors that
go into this calculation of worth vary, depending on the firm. For some firms, the BOD
might believe it is essential to hire an experienced CEO. The CEO’s compensation, even
if in the tens of millions, is a small fraction of what the CEO is worth to the bottom line
of the firm (Neron, 2015; Nickerson, 2017).
The free market argument could also be the cornerstone to refute the claims made
by potential opponents. The gulf between workers’ salaries and executive salaries relates
to the worth of each participant to the organization (Fang & Shi, 2016; O’Reilly, Doerr,
Caldwell, & Chatman, 2014). A good CEO could be worth millions to the company and
might not be easily replaced. The free market argument holds true in the Berkshire
Hathaway argument, which implies that market participants determine the optimal CEO
compensation (Fang & Shi, 2016; O’Reilly, Doerr, et al., 2014).
Another argument is that executive talent must be well-compensated for attraction
and retention. Such talent does take nonfinancial factors into consideration when
choosing their employment situation, which is their prerogative (Giannetti & Metzger,
2015). Executives should, as rational actors, extract the highest possible package of
financial and nonfinancial compensation (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). A competitive
environment could allow executives to receive their incentives (Giannetti & Metzger,
2015). Again, the BOD of a company chooses to pay these salaries because the
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opportunity costs of not paying them are deemed to be too high (Giannetti & Metzger,
2015). The argument is that a properly constructed executive compensation plan will
yield the desired results (Heron & Lie, 2017). Thus, the size of the compensation package
will not determine the level of effectiveness; instead, the size of the compensation
package will determine the structure of the package (Heron & Lie, 2017). Many firms
have a high level of executive compensation matched by high performance. In most
situations, scant publicity or outcry about the issue widely persists (Heron & Lie, 2017).
Members of the BODs must answer to their shareholders. In many cases, if
shareholders are institutions and do not receive a good return, then shareholders start
replacing board members (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). The board, therefore, has a vested
interest in attracting the type of talent that would keep the company competitive
(Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). If executives’ compensation packages are not competitive,
BODs risk their jobs in addition to the profits of the company (Giannetti & Metzger,
2015). Previous studies have shown that the importance of acquisition of talent that is not
expertise-specific to each position at best-performing companies (Neron, 2015;
Nickerson, 2017). The highest performing companies build pools of talent from which
they can draw, as needed (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015). Thus, talented people are
inevitably underutilized at times. Executives’ higher order needs are not always
addressed. Thus, they must have a generous compensation, or when the time comes to
move someone from the organization to a fulfilling higher order executive position, the
talent would not be there (Giannetti & Metzger, 2015).
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CEO compensation proponents point out that the bulk of the CEOs’ excessive
compensation comes in the form of stock or options (Heron & Lie, 2017; Sauset, Waller,
& Wolff, 2015). Such instruments were introduced into executive compensation packages
specifically to align the interests of management with those of shareholders (Heron &
Lie, 2017). The shareholders and the BODs initiated the idea to protect shareholders’
wealth (Huang & Wang, 2015). As well, the instances in which executives have abused
the compensation system occurred. However, those executives often found themselves
being prosecuted. Awarding bonuses to the CEOs with poor performance is not a good
practice. Evidence indicates that reducing executive compensation sends a red flag to
investors, causing rapid erosion of shareholder wealth as the stock price dropped (Heron
& Lie, 2017). Regulating or scrapping the entire system of executive compensation is
unreasonable simply because some firms are not good at designing executive
compensation plans (Heron & Lie, 2017).
The free market philosophy underlays the beliefs of executive compensation not
being too high. Advocates of the free market claimed that the market is irrational and
favorable tax treatments encouraged equity-based compensation (Bolton, Mehran, &
Shapiro 2015; Hitz & Müller-Bloch, 2015). By the time the tax treatment was changed,
the concept had become standard practice; shareholders have only recently begun to
exercise their rights in a meaningful way (Bolton et al., 2015). However, a handful of
major institutional investors, such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CalPERS), still had strict policies regarding executive compensation (Hitz &
Müller-Bloch, 2015).
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While the CalPERS and protesters from the Occupy Wall Street movement
opposed high executive compensation on financial grounds, forming the basis of most
objections to executive compensation levels was due to economic and social inequality
(Keister, 2014). The social-stratification view stemmed from the notion of patterned
principles, where a social order with more than the role of government was to pull levers
of power to bring reality closer than just social order (Keister, 2014). Executives’ average
compensations, as compared to those of workers, were high enough. Research showed
the compensation—or payment gap—between the executives (CEOs or managers) and
ordinary workers has increased rapidly every year (Shue & Townsend, 2017). Executives,
as leaders of the workforce, play an important role in every organization and act as key
members. They lead and manage the standards, processes, production, and quality control
of an organization (Nickerson, 2017). The executives’ high compensation rates are
understandable because of executives’ specific and crucial responsibilities (Nickerson,
2017). As stated above, the growing compensation gap between the executives and
workers is a fundamental factor of inequality, which influences the environment of
society and produces negative impacts (Keister, 2014).
Executives’ high compensation rates have an impact not only on the social
environment of the countries in which their firms operate but also on the economy of
those countries. The growing inequality is not just because of salary or wage differences,
but also about the executive shares and stock in the organization (Gao, Luo, & Tang,
2015). Executives also receive benefits in the form of allowances and bonuses. The BOD
or the organization director invests too much to compensate the right person for the
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executive-level job (Guo et al., 2015). The government could control the high
compensation issue by implementing regulatory procedures and a more sophisticated tax
system on such executive salary packages (Gao et al., 2015). The business community
and executives usually consider regulations as government interference in business,
which had a potential for yielding unstable factors to the government politically.
Therefore, the executive compensation regulation system is not a good option to reduce
or eliminate the inequality. On the other hand, taxation system could reduce the income
inequality, and people could get benefits from the tax system (Gao et al., 2015).
Disagreements about the impact of firm size on CEOs’ compensation and the
relationship of firm size with CEOs’ total compensation occurred in the financial services
industry (Lin et al., 2013). CEOs’ compensation relates not only to the size of firms, but
also to the CEOs’ tenure, both of which contribute to the overall compensation (Lin et al.,
2013). However, evidence and research also indicated that while a relationship existed
between firm size and CEO compensation, the relationship was sensitive to the period
selected for the study (Banker et al., 2013). The reason being the existence of this
relationship was not reported in research for the period from the 1940s to the early 1970s.
To be consistent with previous studies, researchers reported that executive compensation
was strongly and positively correlated with accounting returns (Banker et al., 2013; Lin et
al., 2013). In addition, both accounting returns and market returns have a direct impact on
executive compensation. Lin et al. found that regardless of the measurement of
compensation (cash compensation only or total compensation), both accounting and
market returns influenced executive compensation.
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Executive compensation and firm performance. Hou, Lee, Stathopoulos, and
Tong (2016) indicated that executive compensation structure could influence the
development of enterprises, but the research findings vary widely. Moreover, different
perspectives emerged on the variables and their influence factors on corporate
performance (Hou et al., 2016). Most scholars advocated that the link between CEOs’
compensation and performance of firms would ease the conflicts between shareholders’
and executives’ interests and help solve the problem of agency. High compensation for
CEOs could improve the profitability of the corporation, as represented in annual revenue
of the firm (Graham et al. 2012).
Hou et al. (2016) found the same result–equity compensation is helpful for
motivating executives to create enterprise value. The authors discovered a strong
correlation between executive remuneration and the market value of the firm (Hou et al.,
2016). Banker et al. (2013) also found positive effects of CEO compensation, and showed
the managerial ownership has a positive incentive effect and could thus significantly
improve operating performance of the company; in other words, a positive correlation
exists between executive compensation structure and growth in annual revenue of the
main business. Banker et al. performed a multiple linear regression analysis using ROE
and individual stock performance as predictor variables, and CEOs’ salary, CEOs’ bonus,
and CEOs’ equity compensation as criterion variables. They determined that from 1993
through 2006, using data of 15,512 CEOs, ROE and stock performance of an individual
firm had a positive association with both CEOs’ salary and CEOs’ equity-based
compensation (Banker et al., 2013).
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Gibbons and Murphy conducted a survey of the entrepreneurs of the top 500
companies in Happy Magazine, and more than half of the survey participants indicated
the financial index method was more appropriate than other methods for evaluating
financial performance of firms (Graham et al., 2012). Empirical research of 367
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange revealed that accounting indexes are
a commonly used method for evaluating the performance of entrepreneurs instead of
stock returns (Graham et al., 2012). In addition, Lin et al. (2013) reported that firm size,
as measured by total assets of a firm, has a significantly positive relationship with CEOs’
incentive compensation. Firm size is a measurement to differentiate the size of each firm
by total assets of the firm (Lin et al., 2013).
In recent years, many organizations have increased the proportion of stock options
in executive compensation structure (Fralich & Fan, 2015). Regarding the proportion of
shareholding, Fralich and Fan (2015) found a positive correlation between managers’
ownership and corporation performance. DeYoung et al. (2013) found that CEO
compensation is significantly related to company characteristics, corporate governance
mechanism, and other factors. In private enterprises and foreign investment holding
companies, annual executive remuneration has a significant correlation with the annual
revenue (DeYoung et al., 2013).
Scholars have found that executive compensation structure is closely related to
the performance of corporations (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). Some researchers have
carried out relevant empirical research on the mutual relationships of executive basic
salary, bonuses, benefits, risks, and income. According to Cooper, Gulen, and Rau

48
(2016), the difficulty of distinguishing between the business performance and fixed salary
might equate to a greater value in the compensation structure. If the shareholding ratio of
CEOs was high, the cash reward would be relatively low (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016).
Individual ownership would replace the salary incentive, and there would be a negative
correlation between incentive compensation and executive ownership (Cooper et al.,
2016). Increased executive ownership could help coordinate the interests between
executives and owners, and potentially reduce the agency costs (Chakravarty & Grewal,
2016).
Nulla (2013a) used independent variables of ROE and annual revenue, and the
dependent variable of CEOs’ total compensation in the study. The results indicated the
existence of a positive relationship between CEO compensation and CEO age, using
accounting performance as a benchmark (Nulla, 2013a). Graham et al. (2012) contributed
to the study of executive compensation by modeling the fixed effect of managers, which
refers to the heterogeneity of the managerial talents and human capital. Therefore, the
model may explain some of the high levels of executive compensations. Graham et al.
suggested that executives with high compensation and increased corporate performance
are identified to be highly aligned. Furthermore, Graham et al. found that managers with
a higher than expected level of compensation would take measures to prevent losing their
jobs and the excess compensation by choosing lower leverage. The authors pointed out
that executives’ human capital accounts for better corporate performance (Graham et al.,
2012).
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Brisker and Wang (2017) used a quantitative correlational design to explore the
relationship between CEOs’ deferred compensation, capital structure of the firm, and
firm performance. They used the deferred compensation data set to measure CEOs’
aversion to risk. Brisker and Wang also provided firsthand evidence of the relationship
between CEO risk preferences and firm risk, such as stock return volatility, earnings
volatility, and the riskiness of financial and investment policies. The results indicated that
risk-taking CEOs pursue risky financial and investment firm policies, based on the
behavioral consistency theory to demonstrate that CEOs act consistency across personal
and professional situations (Brisker & Wang, 2017). Meanwhile, Alves, Couto, and
Francisco (2016) used a quantitative correlational method to examine the link between
CEOs’ compensation and characteristic of firms, including shareholders' return, and
stakeholders' characteristics. Alves et al. used a unique, hand-collected data set of 450
Portuguese companies listed on the Portugal Stock Exchange for the period of 2002–
2011. The dependent variable was the log of CEO earnings, while the independent
variables included the log of assets, dividend yield, CEO age, CEO tenure, stock
earnings, and so on (Alves et al., 2016). Alves et al. used the ordinary least squares
regression analysis at the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, resulting in some
variables losing statistical significance. The results indicated that, in comparison with the
previous research findings for CEOs in other countries, CEO earnings in Portugal were at
the consistent level (Alves et al., 2016).
Alves et al. (2016) also found that CEO earnings were higher in large firms,
which yielded a higher level of dividend. Higher CEO age drove the earnings up; CEOs
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with higher education levels had lower earnings (Alves et al., 2016; Falato et al, 2015).
Regarding the characteristics of BODs, the larger the compensation and governance
committee is, where more foreign directors included, the higher earnings CEOs receive
(Alves et al., 2016). However, firms in which the CEOs who also served as chairmen of
BODs received lower earnings, while larger size of the board and more independent
directors involved. Alves et al. suggested and validated the linkage between CEOs’
compensation and characteristics of the firm, based on the new insights to determinants
of CEOs’ earnings.
Zou, Zeng, Lin, and Xie (2015) conducted an empirical investigation of the
relationship between top executives’ compensation and environmental performance in
China. The result indicated that best-performing executives’ cash compensation has a
positive relation with company environmental performance, whereas equity ownership
has a negative relation with company environmental performance (Zou et al., 2015). The
results also showed that, in these relationships, the competition played a moderating role.
In more competitive industries, pay and ownership have stronger relationships with
environmental performance (Zou et al., 2015). Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017)
examined the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and performance of firms based
on data of large European firms from 2009 to 2013. The results suggested that company
market efficiency has a high intercorrelation with CEOs’ compensation (Smirnova &
Zavertiaeva, 2017). Accounting-based performance, such as ROA, was found to have a
correlation with the cash and bonus portions of CEOs’ compensation, while incentive
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compensation might have an association with performance of the firm (Smirnova &
Zavertiaeva, 2017).
However, some scholars also opined that executive compensation is negatively
correlated with business growth of the firm (Banker et al., 2013). Banker et al. found
ROE is negatively related to a CEO’s bonus. Banker et al. also concluded that the bonus
has a negative relationship to past performance. Compensation committees should
evaluate the use of salary and bonuses and ensure that each method of compensation
aligns with the performance of the firm (Chen, Chen, et al, 2014; Veliyath et al., 2016).
Often, the size of a BOD also has relevance as BOD size is related to risk-taking choices
within a firm (Huang & Wang, 2015). Huang and Wang determined that smaller BODs
increased the risk-taking behavior of chief executives through the larger incentives in
their compensation. Huang and Wang also concluded that CEOs working with the
oversight of smaller BODs would elect less leverage (debt), but would take on higher risk
in projects than those CEOs who had the oversight of a larger BOD. CEO tenure was
used as a measurement of the number of years a CEO has held his or her position (Lin et
al., 2013).
In addition, Kim, Kogut, and Yang (2015) analyzed the drastic shift of income
inequality in the United States and blamed executive compensation for being the primary
source. They proposed three potential explanations, including interlocking directorates,
peer groups, and educational networks (Kim et al., 2015). Kim et al. failed to find
supporting statistical evidence of the explanatory power of peer and education network
on excessively high executive compensation. Therefore, managerial talent could not be
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the major source of rapid growth of executive compensations, which were growing faster
than the market valuation or size of the firm (Kim et al., 2015). The only justified
explanation of their statistical analysis was corporate director networks (Withisuphakorn
& Jiraporn, 2017). Namely, it was the power of executives and interlocking directorates
to blame for the speedy growth of executive compensations (Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn,
2017).
Jenter and Kanaan (2015) found similar results as to the study of Kim et al.
(2015). Jenter and Kanaan examined the probability of CEO dismissal against corporate
performance by using the hand-collected data over the period of 1993–2009. The results
suggested that CEOs were more likely to have dismissals in a market downturn than
during a boom period, which was an exogenous factor beyond the CEOs’ control (Jenter
& Kanaan, 2015). Jenter and Kanaan proposed the explanation that performance in a
recession was more indicative of managerial ability and quality of the firm-CEO match.
The implication of this literature was to use relative performance measures such as
benchmark performance against peer performance, or value-weighted industry or market
performance (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).
The researchers asserted that CEOs’ turnover should be an extreme case of payfor-performance because peer performance affected not only compensation, but also
CEOs’ turnover (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). Even though Jenter and Kanaan pointed out
that CEO compensation can lead to innovation, Brisker et al. (2014) concluded that it can
lead to less risk taking, which can also be detrimental. Another concern regarding
incentives paid through stock options was the unintended consequence of creating risk
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aversion for the CEO (Brisker et al., 2014). Risk aversion could occur if the CEO has
most of his or her wealth concentrated in stock options and thus tied to the value of the
firm (Brisker et al., 2014; Heron & Lie, 2017). CEOs in a situation with wealth tied
directly to the firm value may be hesitant and reject positive net present value projects,
which were too risky (Heron & Lie, 2017).
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) used a quantitative study to examine the
relationship between an important organizational feature, the structure of managerial
compensation, and value-critical managerial decisions—specifically, the relationship
between managerial compensation, investment policy, debt policy, and firm risks. They
used the S&P ExecuComp database to collect data of selected CEOs (Coles et al., 2006).
However, Coles et al. did not identify the conceptual framework on which they based the
test; they concluded that higher sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to stock volatility (vega)
implements riskier policy choices. Coles et al. also found that riskier policy choices lead
to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock return volatility was
found to have a positive effect on both vega and delta (Coles et al., 2006).
Similar to Coles et al. (2006)’s study, Brisker et al. (2014) empirically examined
whether CEOs had the incentive to time the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) when they
thought the stock price was overvalued in the market while they held high equity-based
compensation. They found that the firms with that kind of CEOs would experience
abnormally low stock returns and relatively low operating performance in the 3-year
period following the SEOs (Brisker et al., 2014). The authors concluded that CEOs with a
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high level of equity-based compensation was self-motivated by timing SEOs when stocks
were overpriced (Brisker et al., 2014).
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) investigated the relationship between CEO
pay slice (CPS) and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The results
were based on data collected from the Compustat and ExecuComp databases for the
period of 1993–2004, using regression analysis with control variables and correlation
analysis (Bebchuk et al., 2011). Bebchuk et al. determined that CPS has a negative
impact on firm value, as well as negative correlation against accounting profitability,
stock return accompanying acquisitions, performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and
stock market return. Moreover, CPS has an association with higher odds of lucky grants
with low prices for CEOs. Higher CPS would lead to a series of risks and further impact
corporate performance (Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn, 2017). Higher CPS represents
CEOs’ superior power over the boards, as well as greater extent for CEOs to extract
payment, which was still in line with the argument in the framework of agency theory
(Bebchuk et al., 2011; Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn, 2017).
Shim and Kim (2015) conducted Pearson’s correlation and ordinary least square
(OLS) regression to test the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate
performance; the results indicated that market-based performance measures are strongly
correlated with CEO compensation in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act period. Results
of research by Cooper et al. (2016) indicated that corporate performance has no
correlation with executive compensation. Cooper et al. also had different explanations for
the causes of no correlation between executive compensation and firm growth. However,
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accounting-based performance measures correlated positively with CEO compensation in
the post-SOX period. The results indicated that the SOX Act played a vital role in
explaining changes in the relationship between performance expectations of firms and
CEOs’ compensation (Shim & Kim, 2015). In brief, results of much research have
revealed that executive compensation structure has a significant influence on executive
behavior and a strong incentive effect on business growth.
Executive compensation in the banking industry. Studies have shown the
unique characteristics of the banking sector that make the nature of CEOs’ compensation
unlike that of other industries (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015; Leventis, Dimitropoulos, &
Owusu-Ansah, 2013; Liu, Padgett, & Varotto, 2017; Nguyen, Nguyen, & Yin, 2015).
Leventis et al. conducted a quantitative correlational study to examine the relationship
between the corporate governance and the performance (with accounting conservatism)
of banks. The authors discussed the importance of having an effective corporate
governance to banking corporations due to the information asymmetry (Nguyen et al.,
2015). Levantis et al. identified executive compensation as a major component of
corporate governance while using earnings per share and the buy-and-hold stock return as
the variables of measurement to financial performance. The authors selected 421 publicly
listed commercial banks in the United States; during the sample period of 2003–2009,
where 47% of banks from the sample reported a negative stock return in a given year
(Leventis et al., 2013). Using a Pearson’s pairwise correlation test for data analysis,
Leventis et al. found banks with better incentives for management did not necessarily
perform well in terms of stock return and earnings. However, Leventis et al. also found
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that banking CEOs received high compensation levels for boosting the financial
performance of their firms. The authors suggested that BODs of banks should engage in
the practice of conservatism to reduce financial risks (Leventis et al., 2013).
Cerasi and Oliviero (2015) measured the corporate performance from two
periods: before the financial crisis (2005–2006) and during the financial crisis (2007–
2008). Cerasi and Oliviero studied the relationship between CEOs’ financial incentives
and the volatility of performance by banks during the financial crisis. In a similar study,
Liu et al. (2017) observed how executive compensation changes might relate to corporate
governance by using a sample of 214 U.S. banking mergers from the Thomson ONE
Banker database. Cerasi and Oliviero divided the performance measurements into two
different groups: one group included ROA, market return from stock prices, capital ratio,
book value, and total assets for 2005–2006; the other group was buy-and-hold return and
its standard deviation for 2007–2008. The authors employed new data sources combined
from Bankscope and S&P Capital IQ-People Intelligence databases for 116 large banks
worldwide (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). Results of regression analysis revealed that banks
with better CEOs' financial incentives had higher volatility, lower buy-and-hold returns
amid the crisis, and higher Tobin’s Q before the crisis (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). The
implication was that the relationship between two variables could be dynamic and vary
over time (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015).
To measure CEOs’ compensation, Cerasi and Oliviero (2015) applied the
definitions that consisted of variables of cash bonus over salary, equity bonus over salary,
total bonus over salary, and value of total compensation. They found a lack of evidence
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for a relation between CEOs' compensation and performance of firms from the sample
data (Cerasi & Oliviero, 2015). However, Liu et al. (2017) initially obtained a sample
size of 478, from which they reduced the sample size by applying certain criteria such as
whether the deal was closed between the years 1995–2012, whether bidder and target
firm were commercial banks. For CEO compensation, the authors collected data
manually from financial statements that were available from the SEC EDGAR website
(Liu et al., 2017).
Liu et al. (2017) developed hypotheses based whether CEOs’ compensation is at
an optimal level when changes in compensation have a positive relationship with
performance of the firm, which was not affected by the articulation of corporate
governance. A corporate governance index (CGI) contains a set of variables that measure
the wellness of overall corporate governance (Iqbal & Javed, 2017; Liu et al., 2017). The
authors found that CGI increased throughout the time span; however, the differences
between the sample period of 2004–2012 and 1995–2003 had a statistical significance of
the mean values of CGI (Liu et al., 2017). Such a result coincided with the introduction
of the SOX Act in 2002 (Liu et al., 2017; Shim & Kim, 2015). By using a series of
regression analyses, Liu et al. concluded that changes in CEOs’ salary for bank mergers
had a positive relationship with the performance of bidding banks, and that this
performance did not have a relationship with the CGI. Liu et al. stated that being satisfied
with the optimal contracting hypothesis, meaning the banking CEO compensation
settings aligned with shareholders' interests. Likewise, changes to CEOs' cash bonus for
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bank mergers had a negative relationship with the firms' performance, which was clearly
influence by the CGI (Liu et al., 2017).
In contrast to pay-for-performance sensitivity, DeYoung et al. (2013) studied payrisk sensitivity, namely the change of CEOs’ compensation against stock volatility. Guo
et al. (2015) investigated whether CEOs’ compensation composition played a role in
promoting risk-taking behaviors in the banking industry. Prager (2014) examined the
relationship between risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance in
the context of financial regulation. Guo et al. conducted a quantitative regression study to
examine how CEO compensation composition relates to the incentive of banks for risk
taking. The study was also about the examination of the relationship between banking
CEOs’ compensation and changes in risk-taking opportunities before and during the
financial crisis (Guo et al., 2015).
DeYoung et al. (2013) justified the link between risk-taking incentives to
financially risky business policies. Banking CEOs were not only aware of the risk-taking
behaviors, but also acted in response to the incentives of their commercial contracts.
DeYoung et al. also pointed out the bank boards were monitoring the risk outcomes by
adjusting proper compensation contracts, especially for those banks with a large
proportion of income from nontraditional activities. The authors grasped the unique
characteristics of the banking sector and the implied incentives in contract, which,
although not be a quantitative measurement, might have played an important role in
determining CEOs’ compensation and influencing CEOs’ behavior (DeYoung et al.,
2013).
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Guo et al. (2015) collected data from the ExecuComp database for top executives'
compensation and from the Bankscope database for financial statements, respectively, for
a sample of publicly traded banking companies between 1992 and 2008 (before and
during the financial crisis). The measurement of the independent variable of total
compensation was the maximum of the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan
payouts, other annual, restricted stock grants, and all other value of option grants (Guo et
al., 2015). As well, Prager (2014) proposed to answer the questions that emerged during
the financial crisis and pointed out that financial firms should be different from
nonfinancial firms. Prager summarized previous studies and results by conducting a
literature review study to answer the question of whether misaligned incentive and
mismanagement existed for investment banks, mortgage funding corporations, and other
credit rating agencies. Prager collected sample data of literature for U.S. and European
banks and found that banks in which the chief risk officer (CRO) reported to the board
rather than to CEO would have higher stock returns and ROE during the financial crisis.
Therefore, they concluded that CROs might be able to perform their jobs to restrain
CEOs from taking risky actions (Prager, 2014).
Transition
In Section 1, I presented the problem underlying the intended study. Also
presented were the purpose of the intended study, the nature of the intended study, the
research question, hypotheses, the theoretical framework, the operational definitions, the
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, implications for social change, and a review
of the professional and academic literature. Results of the literature review indicated the
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need for the present study, the purpose of which was to examine the existence of a
predictive relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options).
In Section 2, I discuss the project, which includes a restatement of the problem,
the role of the researcher, the participants, the research method and design, the population
and sampling, ethical considerations, instrumentation, data collection technique, data
analysis process, and the study validity. In Section 3, I present the data analysis results,
application to business practice, implication to social change, recommendations for future
studies, and reflections.
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Section 2: The Project
This section includes an overview of the methodology and design used in this
study. I discuss the selection and justification of the research method and design in detail.
I also present the (a) role of the research, (b) research participants, (c) instrumentation
used for data collection, (d) consideration of ethical research, (e) techniques of data
collection, and (f) data analysis procedures. I conclude this section by addressing the
threats to study validity.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the predictive
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options).
The independent variables (predictors) were ROE of the firm and annual revenue the
firm. The dependent variable (criterion) was CEO’s total compensation. Archival data for
U.S. publicly traded banks from 2010 to 2015 were used to quantify both the predictor
variables and the criterion variable. Data were available in firm-year format.
This study may contribute to social change by providing new information that can
assist individuals on BODs when making decisions to incentivize CEOs, such as
including various types of bonuses in CEOs’ compensation packages. Misalignment
between CEOs’ compensation and performance of firms may be of concern to the public
(Nulla, 2013b). However, the general public and the other stakeholders might have
limited awareness about the extent to which such a misalignment might have a negative
impact on the financial performance of firms. This study could lead BODs to a better
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understanding of how firms’ financial performance should affect CEOs’ compensation,
which may contribute to improved public perception.
Role of the Researcher
My role as a researcher in the data collection process of this quantitative
correlational study was to ensure careful selection of data sources and the validity of
study results. I had to ensure that data from publicly available sources used in this study
were collected in a reliable and valid manner. My research role also encompassed data
analysis of the final data sets. Bozkurt, Akgun-Ozbek, and Zawacki-Richter (2017)
reviewed previous studies and concluded that researchers can be learners or observers
who draw and present conclusions from the synthesis of data and previous findings. Brett
et al. (2014) summarized the researchers’ role as ensuring that the research conducted has
high quality by analyzing relevant scientific data in detail and with care.
Roulston and Shelton (2015) stated that researchers must be objective, neutral,
and impartial in the research process. To ensure that researchers do not introduce
personal biases affecting statistical analysis, researchers must be able to state the
perspective of participants before undertaking the data collection (Coburn & Penuel,
2016). My relationship with the topic of the study was intentional because I demonstrated
great interest in quantitative correlational studies. I accessed archives of the S&P
ExecuComp and S&P Compustat databases, which were publicly available data. My
relationship with participants was neutral and independent. I targeted the U.S. banking
industry because of the interests from the identified gaps in the literature review and my
previous work inside of it.
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While the role of the researcher is to initialize the review process and avoid
potential ethical dilemmas in the research (Page & Nyeboer, 2017), members of
institutional review boards (IRB) ensure that research conforms with practices, protocols,
and other regulatory aspects articulated in the Belmont Report, which contains a summary
of basic ethical principles and guidelines for research involving human subjects (Fiske &
Hauser, 2014). The Belmont Report includes the principles of respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice (Fiske & Hauser, 2014). These principles have led researchers to
apply for following requirements: (a) informed consent, (b) risk and benefits analysis,
and (c) selection of subjects (Friesen, Kearns, Redman, & Caplan, 2017; Jones &
McCullough, 2015). These guidelines and applications did not apply to this study because
I did not involve human subjects in my research.
Participants
For this study, I used archival data sources throughout and did not make use of
human subjects. Cornelissen (2016) asserted that using secondary data analysis ensures
not only the generalizability of findings but also the likelihood of decreasing ethical risks.
The use of archival data was the most appropriate method for addressing the research
questions for this study. Johnston (2014) suggested that researchers should select the
appropriate data collection method that may save time, effort, and resources. All data
were sourced from the archives of S&P ExecuComp and S&P Compustat databases,
which were publicly available. Moore (2014) also conducted research using archival data
in the U.S. health services industry. I did not need to create any strategies for gaining
permission to access the data used in this study (see Appendix C).
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Archival Data of Compensation
The S&P ExecuComp database was the source for data on CEO compensation.
The S&P ExecuComp database contains annual compensation data on the top five
executive officers of all S&P 1000 companies since 1992; these records represent more
than 3,300 companies and data on 39,000 executives (Gillan, Hartzell, Koch, & Starks,
2017). Executive data consist of compensation information, such as salary, cash bonuses,
stock options, and other bonuses (Gillan et al., 2017). In this study, I targeted only CEOs’
compensation data of commercial banking companies—SIC 6020.
The S&P ExecuComp database is an accurate and unbiased collection of
executive compensation data sourced from proxy statements of annual reports for
included firms (Gillan et al., 2017). Mathuva (2014) argued that although researchers
have raised concerns about the reliability of these archival data, the financial data reports
have gone through the audit and validation process to attest to their reliability. The S&P
ExecuComp is popular in published research (Gillan et al., 2017). Falato et al. (2015)
conducted research to examine the relationship between the financial performance of
firms, CEOs’ skills, and CEOs’ compensation by using archival data from the S&P
ExecuComp database. Guo et al. (2015) also conducted a quantitative regression analysis,
using the S&P data, to determine the extent to which salaries, cash bonuses, and longterm incentives of executives were related to corporates’ risk-taking activities. Based on
this research, I concluded that the archival data from the S&P ExecuComp database are
an accurate representation of CEOs’ compensation, which was the criterion variable in
the present study.
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Archival Data of Financial Performance
The S&P Compustat database was the source of information on ROE and annual
revenue of companies. The S&P Compustat database is a resource financial, statistical
and market information on companies’ performance worldwide, which has wide usage in
research. (Casey, Gao, Kirschenheiter, Li, & Pandit, 2015; Chen & Waters, 2017).
Bragaw and Misangyi (2017) examined the relationship between CEOs’ prior
experiences, initial compensation, and market-based performance of firms using archival
data from the S&P Compustat database. The S&P Compustat database contains
information sourced from the financial statements of publicly traded companies (Casey et
al., 2015). Johnston (2014) stated that data from financial reports are reliable due to the
auditing and validating processes of those publicly traded firms. Financial reporting
indices were the best representation of financial performance of firms (Melitski, &
Manoharan, 2014). ROE and annual revenue were predictor variables derived from the
research question of this study. Therefore, I used archival data from the S&P Compustat
database to address the research question.
Research Method and Design
Research Method
I relied on quantitative methodology to address the research question. This
approach was appropriate for the study because the study involved testing the existence
of a relationship between two sets of variables. Quantitative method is a type of empirical
research for testing statistical hypotheses under the framework of a theory (Trafimow,
2014). This study also involved claims (hypotheses), which consisted of variables.
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Quantitative method concerns the development of hypotheses and testing hypotheses
(Choy, 2014). Variables should be measurable using numbers and analyzable with
statistical techniques (Ingham-Broomfield, 2014).
A qualitative approach was not appropriate for the study because qualitative
research focuses on establishing a theory, a definition, or the understanding of a
phenomenon (Cho & Lee, 2014). Qualitative method also involves different approaches
regarding data analysis process; typically, qualitative researchers convert data into
themes or patterns for analysis (Daigneault, 2014). Finally, the qualitative research
method was not suitable for analyzing or testing the relationship between numerically
valued variables (Sandelowski, 2014).
A mixed-methods approach was also not appropriate for this study. Mixedmethods research combines both qualitative and quantitative aspects into understanding
and verifying complex phenomena (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). The mixed methods
rely on quantitative data to yield statistical results, which in turn leads to the development
of specific follow-up questions for in-depth understanding of the process and underlying
relationship (Birchall et al., 2016). In addition, some researchers argued that the mixed
methods provide increased accuracy for the study (Özdemir & Adan, 2014). However,
this study did not have the need for understanding a phenomenon.
Research Design
A correlational design was the most suitable approach for this study. The focus of
the study was on the examination of the relationship between variables. Quantitative
researchers measure two or more sets of variables and use findings of correlational design
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to determine the relationship between variables (Curtis, Comiskey, & Dempsey, 2016).
The correlational design involves using natural and continuous variables from the
interested population, where no manipulation of the variable is necessary (Rucker,
McShane, & Preacher, 2015). Alves et al. (2016) conducted research using correlational
design to examine the relationship between dependent variables and independent
variables. Hence, the correlational design was suitable for the study.
The traditional experimental design was not appropriate for this study. First, the
experimental design is best for studying the main effects and interactions between more
sets of process variables or factors (Barka et al., 2014). Second, the experimental design
often involves the manipulation of variables to understand how changes in one variable
affect other variables (Rucker et al., 2015). Finally, researchers conduct scientific
experimental design to find the optimal values of variables, rather than finding the
relationship between variables (Callao, 2014). The purposes of employing an
experimental design exceeded the scope for this study.
The quasi-experimental design was also not appropriate for this study. Quasiexperimental designs are unlike experimental designs that test the causal consequences of
treatments outside of the laboratory (Cook, 2015). Furthermore, quasi-experimental
design does not fulfill the requirement of this study to test the relationship between
variables. This quantitative design was concerned with yielding insights on the short-term
results that need follow-up, as well as publication biases (Irvin & Kaplan, 2014).
Therefore, the correlational design was the only suitable one for addressing the research
question and testing hypotheses of the study.
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Population and Sampling
The general population of this study was archival data of CEOs’ compensation,
ROE, and annual revenue, from all publically traded commercial banks with a SIC code
of 6020, including SIC codes of 6021 (national commercial banks), 6022 (state
commercial banks), and 6029 (commercial banks, not elsewhere classified) located
within the United States. I designated this population because the research question was
to discover whether a predictive relationship exists between ROE of a firm, annual
revenue of a firm, and CEO’s compensation. The population of a study should logically
stem from the research question of the study, as well as a sampling plan (Palinkas et al.,
2015). Palinkas et al. also stated that quantitative study emphasizes the generality of
knowledge is the representative of the population.
The randomly selected samples were from archival data of U.S.-based publicly
traded commercial banks. This sampling method was a probabilistic simple random
procedure. First, the sample of population should be randomized (probabilistic) because
the sampling must have representativeness of the population (Anderson et al., 2015).
Second, employing such a sampling method was a feasible and efficient data collection
process. Duan, Bhaumik, Palinkas, and Hoagwood (2015) alleged that convenience
sampling may achieve the maximum effectiveness of limited resources. However,
Peterson and Merunka (2014) argued that statistical inferences using a convenience
sample would cause a limitation to generalize results to a different population, which
meant the study would have limited reproducibility. Probabilistic sampling was optimal
because the research results could extend the generalization (Kandola, Banner, O'Keefe-
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McCarthy, & Jassal, 2014). Third, random sampling ensures that every member of the
population has an equal opportunity to be selected (Emerson, 2015). I used computergenerated random numbers assigned to members of the population for sampling in this
study.
The simple random sampling technique has both its strengths and weaknesses. For
instance, this approach has the benefit of requiring minimal knowledge of the target
population (Kandola et al., 2014). Kandola et al. further concluded that using simple
random sampling can achieve high internal and external validity. On the other hand, the
downside of using such a method can be (a) high cost, (b) requiring a sampling frame, or
(c) introducing large sampling errors (Kandola et al., 2014). Therefore, researchers
should take the size of samples into considerations to ensure the generalizability of the
research, as well as balance the use of resources for their research (Anderson et al.,
2015).
In this study, I used G*Power (Version 3.1.9.2) to calculate the sample size.
G*Power is a free and stand-alone computer program, which researchers commonly use
to perform statistical power analysis and tests in social and behavioral research
(Macfarlane et al., 2015). G*Power Version 3.1 provided enhancements to previous
versions and included procedures for correlation and regression analysis (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2009). Specifically, researchers use a priori power analysis to estimate
the sample size before conducting the research (Walum, Waldman, & Young, 2016). In
the research planning phase, researchers must anticipate an effect size (the strength of
correlation) to estimate the sample size for a given power level (1- β) and significance
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level (α). Tomczak and Tomczak (2014) explained that a small effect size would lead to
the requirement of a large sample size to reach a certain statistical significance level,
whereas a large effect size leads to small sample size. Walum et al. also suggested using a
standardized Cohen’s effect sizes (of 0.1 = small, 0.3 = medium, and 0.5 = large) or a
reference from the literature reviews.
I conducted a priori power analysis using the following values to calculate the
sample size: α = 0.05; power (1- β) = 0.95; and anticipated effect size = 0.2. The result of
the calculation was 81 for the required sample size. Bosco et al. (2015) argued that the
benchmarks for effect size had an update of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 for small, medium, and
large, respectively. Bosco et al. further observed different correlational studies with the
effect size ranging from 0.10 to 0.80 and concluded that the distribution of effect size
exhibited a mapping to Cohen’s benchmarks. Tomczak and Tomczak (2014) further
asserted that researchers had a difficulty in determining an accurate effect size and
suggested selecting an effect size between 0.2 and 0.8. I also reviewed other doctoral
studies from both Walden and other universities to get an idea of how these researchers
decided on an effect size value. Moore (2014) conducted the study with a value of effect
size at 0.498 and suggested using a larger sample size to address an outstanding
generalizability. Heron (2015) studied the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and
financial performance of firms with an effect size of 0.35 to be able to reject the null
hypothesis, resulting in support of the hypothesis of the existence on a positive
relationship between CEO’s compensation and financial performance of the firm.
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Ethical Research
All data in this analysis were publicly available, historical data from archival
sources. Johnston (2014) suggested that using existing data sets could save time and
accelerate the pace of research, provided the same content from the original data
collection was available. However, Cho et al. (2015) pointed out that the existing
regulation also allowed the researchers to alter or waive the informed consent when the
research involved no more than minimal risks to human subjects. Dolan (2015)
emphasized that researchers must invoke the informed consent process when conducting
research on human subjects. The participants of this study included archived data sets that
were publicly available, rather than human subjects. As such, an informed consent
process was not applicable. However, the Walden University IRB needed to review and
approve the application before the data collection process could commence (see
Appendix B). The IRB approval number for the study was 08-03-17-0454701.
Ethical researchers must demonstrate receptiveness, openness, and fairness to
participating human subjects regarding acquisition of informed consents (Simon, Klein,
& Schartz, 2014). Practically, offering an incentive to nudge participants to making their
judgments is not ethically protective of personal autonomy (Ploug & Holm, 2015).
Additionally, the data collection process did not include human subjects; therefore,
concerns related to incentives for participants was also not applicable.
Linder, Elek, and Calderon (2014) raised concerns regarding the ethical challenge
of maintaining confidentiality or anonymity of participants. Because participants of this
study were publicly available data, I did not need to intentionally protect organizations by
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excluding the identity information in any part of the study. Data used in this analysis
were stored on an internal hard drive of a password-protected computer during the study
period. These data were transferred to a flash drive and continued to be stored for 5 years,
after which time I will physically destroy the flash drive.
Instrumentation
In this study, I relied on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet as the instrumentation for
comparing, filtering, storing, and processing raw data. The version of Microsoft Excel
was 2016 through a Microsoft Office 365 subscription. This instrumentation was suitable
for the study because variables and their measurements were numerical formats, which
could be easily managed and processed by the instrument. Omair (2015) discussed and
emphasized the importance of using numerical data because the essence of quantitative
research is to test hypotheses. Guetterman et al. (2015) suggested collecting data with a
series of scales for quantitative studies.
This instrument was a widely available product, which I did not have to acquire
access permission to use it for the research (see Appendix C). Ingham-Broomfield (2014)
noted that researchers should realize appropriateness of the research design regarding the
use of or further developing an effective research instrument. Heale and Twycross (2015)
asserted that researchers must assess the validity of the instrument to ensure it measures
what it is supposed to measure if the researchers use an existing instrument. The
reliability of the instrument reflects the research quality, which relates to the stability and
consistency of the instrument (Heale & Twycross, 2015). In this study, I did not have any
difficulties in neither making sure of the validity of the instrument nor adjusting the
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research instrument, because data sources had the same format as the instrument
(delivered as .csv or .xls files). Also, I did not have any concerns with the reliability of
the instrument because I collected archival data.
The concepts measured by the instrument were CEOs’ total compensation
(including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options), ROE, and
annual revenues of firms for publicly traded commercial banks in the United States from
2010 to 2015. The predictor variables (ROE and annual revenue) were archival data
downloaded from the S&P Compustat database, which were in measurements of the ratio
in the instrument (see Appendix D for a sample of the raw data). The criterion variables
were from the S&P ExecuComp database, which were in ratio as well. The other
variables such as company name and CEO name were in ordinal measurements. I used
the instrument for collecting data of U.S. commercial banks (SIC 6020). Moore (2014)
used the same instrument to collect data from the U.S. health insurance industry (SIC
6320 and 6321). Chakravarty and Grewal (2016) collected data for all publicly held
companies within electric and electronic industries based on SIC codes 3570–3695.
Cremers and Grinstein (2014) collected data for all aspects of CEOs’ compensation from
the S&P ExecuComp database for the period of 1993–2005.
Data Collection Technique
The research question of this study addressed the existence of a predictive
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation within the U.S. banking industry. Hence, ROE of firms, annual revenues of
firms, and CEOs’ compensation were essential information in the data collection process.
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I collected data electronically from the S&P ExecuComp and S&P Compustat databases
via a querying portal, and downloaded data in Microsoft Excel file format. After data
cleaning process, the raw data went through an import process to data analysis software
(IBM SPSS, Version 21.0), which was followed by a merging step. I only included
archival data from years 2010 to 2015, with a filter of SIC code 6020 for commercial
banks.
The reason for selecting such a data collection technique was due to data
availability, relevance, recentness, and convenience. Eckford and Barnett (2016) stated
that the method of online data collection had benefits of obviating the need for
preliminary data entry and saving the cost of instrument administration. Electronic forms
of data collection make the data processing step easier than paper forms (Li et al., 2015).
Wohlin and Aurum (2015) suggested that researchers who had difficulties with accessing
human participants might choose to collect archival data for analysis. Also, using
Microsoft Excel for web-based data mining was a relatively new and effective technique
compared to the other existing ones (Makwana & Rathod, 2014). On the other hand, the
instrument for data collection was also compatible with the statistical analysis software
utilized for the study. IBM SPSS can convert data from Microsoft Excel files (Dezhi &
Shuang, 2014).
Although the archival data collection technique had the advantage of presenting
data sources in a structured and organized fashion (Li et al., 2015), such a technique
might also have its disadvantages. Briones and Benham (2017) argued that the Internetbased data collection method has the selection bias toward the population who has the
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Internet access. Wohlin and Aurum (2015) advocated that researchers should combine
archival data collection with other data collection techniques to mitigate the impact of
missing data components. Lastly, archival data sources were normally not intended for
scientific research purposes, which would need some degree of data interpretation
(Kandampully et al., 2014).
This study did not need to include a pilot study. Sajid et al. (2016) summarized
that the purpose of performing a pilot study is to assess the feasibility of the main study
and derive preliminary estimators for future design. However, Moore (2014) already
conducted a similar research using a different population from this study, which could be
a proof of the feasibility of the study. Lancaster (2015) stated that the primary function of
a pilot study was to evaluate the possibility of success and threats to the validity of the
study with a small sample size. Yang et al. (2014) used a large sample size in a
quantitative study to test the relationship between executive compensation and firm
performance. The pilot study also can be a simulation to the main study with
randomization in place (Whitehead, Sully, & Campbell, 2014). Shim and Kim (2015)
conducted a quantitative research study to examine the relationship between executives’
compensation and performance of firms using randomly selected samples from the
research population. These previous studies have already indicated that the study is
researchable. Hence, I did not conduct a pilot study before the data collection rather
emphasizing on the data analysis to answer the research question.
Data Analysis
The research question and associated hypotheses of the study were as follows:
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Does a predictive relationship exist between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and
CEOs’ total compensation?
H0: A significant predictive relationship does not exist between ROE of firms,
annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking
industry.
Ha: A significant predictive relationship exists between ROE of firms, annual
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation within the U.S. banking industry.
Pallant (2016) summarized that the statistical technique used for exploring the
relationship between variables can be a correlation, a regression, or a factor analysis. To
answer the above research question, I conducted a linear multiple regression analysis to
test a set of hypotheses. The regression test was suitable for this study because the
essence of the research question was to try to determine whether the independent
variables were predictors of the dependent variable. Regression analysis is a statistical
technique to explore the relationship between numerically measured independent and
dependent variables, which emphasizes the prediction or forecasting from one variable to
another (Hopkins & Ferguson, 2014). The hypothesized relationship of this study had the
intention to determine the predictive relationship between variables. Armor, Cotla, and
Stratmann (2017) argued that regression analysis enables researchers to monitor how
criterion variable would change when predictor variables change. Regression analysis
also involves the estimation to responses of one variable caused by the explanatory
variables (Wiedermann, Hagmann, & von Eye, 2015). Kim, Cho, et al. (2015) employed
multivariate regression analysis to assess the predictive relationship between the variables

77
of continuous scales. This study included the variables with measurements in ratios.
Hence, a regression analysis was suitable.
Curtis et al. (2016) further suggested using a scatterplot to obtain an indication of
the correlation between variables, as well as the type of relationship, before conducting
the test. I also used descriptive statistics to explore the description of raw data by
including mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum, and maximum value of variables.
Curtis et al. advised using descriptive statistics for summarizing data and describing the
characteristics of data samples. However, Ploutz-Snyder, Fiedler, and Feiveson (2014)
argued the importance of descriptive statistics being an early research step in statistical
analysis. The inclusion of descriptive statistics could establish associations between the
variables for data delineation (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014).
Although a regression analysis was optimal for the study, I evaluated the
appropriateness of other types of analyses. Pearson’s product-moment correlation
analysis is also a statistical technique for exploring the simple relationship between
independent variables and dependent variables (Curtis et al., 2016). Selection of
correlational analysis depends upon the research question and the level of measurement
(ordinal, interval, or ratio) of variables (Curtis et al., 2016). Hedge, Powell, and Sumner
(2017) also indicated that correlation analysis is concerned with on testing the
significance of a relationship between variables. Therefore, simple correlation analysis
was not suitable for this study.
Factor analysis provides the ability to combine related variables and uncover
patterns from common groups (factors) based on a shared variance (Mthembu, Roman, &

78
Wegner, 2016). Shao et al. (2015) conducted a factor analysis study to summarize the
components and their associations to certain cancer risks from many correlated variables.
As well, Baglin (2014) argued that factor analysis is a process that involves repeating
analysis (rotation) of refining solutions to reach a meaningful result. Factor analysis is for
scientific purposes because of its power and large sample (Zygmont & Smith, 2014),
which was not applicable for this study.
Other types of techniques such as t tests, chi square, analysis of variance
(ANOVA), or multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) were also not applicable to
the study. These aforementioned techniques are used to assess and compare differences
between groups of observations or conditions (Pallant, 2016). For instance, Aghdeab,
Mohammed, and Ubaid (2015) conducted an ANOVA analysis by a comparison to find
out optimizations in design and manufacturing methods. Sharpe (2015) asserted that the
chi-square analysis is a nonparametric technique to identify the difference between
groups of participants when the dependent variable is a measurement of nominal. Wen et
al. (2015) utilized t tests to compare two groups of participants and identify different
effects of treatment. Vossoughi, Shahvali, and Sadeghi (2016) described that the
MANOVA test is best of comparing the mean vector between groups, which in turn
addresses hypotheses related to the differences between groups of data.
Once the data collection process was complete, I began a data cleaning process.
Data cleaning process involved scrutinizing and identifying any missing records or
invalid components in data sets. Hashem et al. (2015) identified that data cleaning was an
important step in the research process. The purpose of data cleaning is to minimize
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problems by correcting invalid data or eliminating missing records (Kongara &
Punyasesudu, 2015). Researchers may utilize either the traditional method (loading into a
spreadsheet) or certain tools for cleaning data, such as Google OpenRefine and Data
Wrangler by Stanford Visualization Group (Batrinca & Treleaven, 2015). Li et al. (2015)
also pointed out that innovative data collection tools could make the data cleaning
process efficient when involving a large amount of raw data. However, I visually scanned
data by applying filters from the spreadsheet because the number of relevant data records
was small.
Then, I deleted the identified discrepancies (missing or invalid data records) from
data sets. Cheema (2014) concluded that case deletion and imputation-based methods are
common missing data handling approaches, where researchers can either simply discard
those records with missing data or replace them. Cheema further stated that using
inappropriate handling approaches might result in poorly estimated parameter and
reduced power of analysis. Ebrahim et al. (2014) emphasized the missing data issue could
result in poor generalization of the research and therefore developed a comprehensive
approach to addressing the missing data issue, which included using a reference
instrument and a complete-case analysis. Aste, Boninsegna, Freno, and Trentin (2015)
suggested that researchers could resolve missing data problems by deleting the whole
case in quantitative observations. In this study, the random sampling procedure provided
the ability to ensure the samples were representative of the population because of data
availability. Hence, the case deletion approach was still feasible.
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Statistical analyses have underlying assumptions that researchers need to consider
before conducting the analysis (Pallant, 2016). The normality, linearity,
homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity of data distribution are assumptions for multiple
linear regression analysis, which represent certain patterns respectively in statistical
plotting (Pallant, 2016). Normally distributed data depict a symmetrical mountain-peakshaped line; linearity is represented by a straight line (or roughly straight line), while
homoscedastic data show a cigarette-shaped pattern (Pallant, 2016). I used histograms, a
normal probability plot (P-P), and scatterplots to assess the normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity of data; these plots were available in IBM SPSS Version 21.0. Nunes,
Alvarenga, de Souza Sant’Ana, Santos, and Granato (2015) pointed out that data
homoscedasticity means that different groups of data have the same value of standard
deviation and further suggested that researchers should utilize statistical functions to
check for homoscedasticity. Puth, Neuhäuser, and Ruxton (2014) also suggested
researchers should check histograms of all variables for any substantial deviation from
normality.
Researchers cannot always assume the normality of data, but may also use other
methods such as bootstrapping for resampling purposes, regardless of the data
distribution (Bro & Smilde, 2014). Nevertheless, in situations where data plots reveal a
violation of the assumption of data distribution, I used an alternative method to carry out
the testing procedures. Banjanovic and Osborne (2016) stated that a bootstrapping
method could be an alternative for resampling by the researcher when violation of the
assumption occurred. Hopkins and Ferguson (2014) also argued that researchers might
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need to adjust data set to address a violation of the assumption in multiple regression
analysis and ensure the accuracy of the test by data transformation. Hopkins and
Ferguson further advised using a specialized regression technique of transformed
variables, such as logarithm or square root.
In SPSS Version 21.0, the default significance level is set at .05, which is a
typical level for published nonscientific research to be considered as statistically
significant (Ives, 2015). The result of a small p value would mean that the predictor has a
good fit in the model to influence the response. The estimated effect size for the study
was .20 as an input of G*Power a priori power analysis to calculate the required sample
size. The confidence level measured how much of samples might contain true parameters
from the population. Hedge et al. (2017) stated a simple way to calculate the confidence
interval (CI) is 100% * (1-α). This study had the estimated CI of 95%. In a regression
analysis, the regression coefficient represents how sensitive the change of criterion
variable is when one of predictor variables changes (Ray-Mukherjee et al., 2014).
Therefore, a high regression coefficient would mean that the model had a good fit or
variables had a strong predictive relationship.
By having completed the regression analysis, results of tests would support a
response of whether to accept or reject predefined hypotheses, which in turn provided the
proof to answer the research question. If the result of probability value (p value) was less
than the significance level, as expected, the test would be significant, which would
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance to the alternative one.
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The flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates the step-by-step data analysis actions in
SPSS.

Figure 1. Data analysis steps in SPSS.
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Study Validity
Validity of a study involves both internal and external aspects. One of the
concerns for internal validity is the approximate truth to inferences regarding the
examination of causal relationship (Ehiri et al., 2014). Lane and Gast (2014) stated that
the internal validity has threats from experimental designs involving an assessment to
effects of treatments or interventions. This study did not have concerns for threats to
internal validity because it was not an experimental design. However, threats to statistical
conclusion validity might be in question (Kratochwill & Levin, 2014).
Statistical Conclusion Validity
Threats to statistical conclusion validity might potentially exist. Statistical
conclusion validity also refers to inferential validity, which is a form for ensuring the
appropriateness of statistics and adequateness of findings for quantitative research
(Rutkowski & Delandshere, 2016). Wester and Borders (2014) conducted research to
review quantitative research articles published in the Journal of Counseling &
Development and further criticized the existence of certain conditions might affect Type I
and Type II error rates. Type I errors refer to the chances of rejecting a true null
hypothesis, while Type II errors refer to the probability of accepting the null hypothesis
when it is, in fact, false (Wester & Borders, 2014). Conditions regarding possible threats
to statistical conclusion validity were as follows: (a) the instrument used was without
reliability and validity check; (b) assumptions to statistical analyses were without
satisfaction; and (c) inadequate sample size selection occurred (Wester & Borders, 2014).
Antonakis, Bastardoz, Liu, and Schriesheim (2014) suggested using a more sophisticated
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design and estimation procedure to minimize the threats to statistical conclusion validity
and make the research more impactful. Next, I covered the following details to address
concerns to statistical conclusion validity in the study.
Reliability of the instrument. The first factor of threats the validity of statistical
conclusions is reliability of the instrument. Cor (2016) emphasized the importance of
study validity and recommended that researchers report the relevant instrument reliability
by including a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha calculation. Finnegan, Runyan, GonzalezPadron, and Hyun (2016) also advocated reporting a Cronbach’s alpha value to measure
the reliability and associated significance. Lachmann, Trapp, and Trapp (2017) suggested
performing an internal consistency check by computing a Cronbach’s alpha value to
assess reliability. The acceptable value of the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha should be
greater than .7. However, the sample value of Cronbach’s alpha does not have a
minimum acceptable level even though some studies had a result of rejection for a
Cronbach’s alpha lower than .7 (Bonett & Wright, 2015). The Cronbach's alpha has been
widely used for assessing the internal reliability of psychological instruments (Samaha &
Hawi, 2016), which was not applicable for this study.
Data assumptions. Data assumptions could be a threat to statistical conclusion
validity. Statistical analyses rely on different assumptions about data distribution. In the
case of a violation of data assumptions, the validity of statistical conclusion would have a
serious impact (Solomon, Howard, & Stein, 2015). Linear regression analysis shares a
few assumptions with other types of analyses such as normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity (Pallant, 2016). For multiple linear regression, I assessed the
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multicollinearity by using the correlation coefficients and a scatterplot between the
predictor variables. Outliers and level of measurement were also factors that could have
an impact on results of regression analysis, especially with a relatively small sample size
selection (Pallant, 2016). I used a histogram, a scatterplot, and a normal P-P plot of the
regression standardized residual to assess the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity; I
used a boxplot to assess outliers.
Sample size. A small sample size might not have the representativeness of the
population, which is potentially a threat. Nuzzo (2016) asserted that quantitative studies
with small sample size selection undermine the achievement of statistical testing power
and significance. Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014) further argued that estimated
effect sizes being true might support the appropriateness of various sample sizes. To
estimate an effective sample size, Macfarlane et al. (2015) suggested researchers perform
a power analysis before the actual studies, which minimizes the threat to study validity.
In this study, a power analysis by using G*Power software ensured that a properly
selected sample size was sufficient.
External Validity
While the internal validity of a study applies to the identified population, Khorsan
and Crawford (2014) expounded that external validity refers to how much
generalizability the results of studies have for expanding to a larger population, different
measurements, or settings. Palinkas et al. (2015) stated that using a probability sampling
strategy may increase the generalizability or transferability of the study (external
validity). On the other hand, one of the weaknesses of a nonprobabilistic sampling
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strategy may be the compromises to the external validity of the study. This study adopted
a random sampling strategy, which was the probabilistic approach. Therefore, the results
could have limitations to the selected population, which was data of CEOs’
compensation, ROE, and annual revenues of all commercial banks located within the
United States. Readers should not generalize the findings and results to other industries.
Transition and Summary
Section 2 contained a comprehensive plan and the underlying rationale for
conducting the research regarding determining the predictive relationship between CEO
total compensation, ROE, and annual revenues of publicly traded commercial banks in
the United States. This study utilized the S&P ExecuComp and S&P Compustat
databases that store publicly available CEO compensation and company financial data,
respectively. The data collection process included downloading data with the instrument
of Microsoft Excel and cleaning data for invalid data records. This study was a
quantitative correlational study in which the relationship between ROE, annual revenue,
and CEOs’ compensation was explored using scatterplots, normal p-p plots, histograms,
and multiple regression analysis. Regression coefficients, a probability value, and
significance level were determinants for answering the research question and making a
conclusion on the existence of a predictive relationship between ROE of firms, annual
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ compensation in the U.S. banking industry. Section 3
presented the conclusive findings of data analysis in detail, recommendations for further
actions or research, and implications of social change.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the predictive
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation (including salary, cash bonuses, bonuses in stock, and bonuses in options).
The predictor variables were ROE of the firm and annual revenue of the firm. The
criterion variable was CEO’s total compensation. From the results of the statistical
analysis, there was a significant predictive relationship between ROE of firms, annual
revenues of firms, and the CEOs’ total compensation, which was based on data of a
sample size that had moderate generalizability to the population.
Presentation of the Findings
The statistical analysis of sample data of ROE of U.S. banking firms, annual
revenues of firms, and CEOs’ compensation yielded some perspectives to the regression
model. Details of these findings in this section include (a) the testing of assumptions, (b)
descriptive statistics, (c) inferential statistics results, and (d) a theoretical conversation
pertaining to the findings. I used the variable transformation approach to avoid the
potential influence of violated assumptions. Specifically, the logarithmic model depicted
a predictive relationship between variables in percentage changes. This transformation
was more realistically approachable due to the nature of the variables used in this study.
Tests of Assumptions
The data preparation and the preliminary analysis of data were important
processes before the actual statistical analysis. Pallant (2016) emphasized the need for
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parametric assumption evaluation to enhance the significance of the test. Initially, I
checked for the distribution of data by plotting histograms. However, I discovered that
none of these variables were normally distributed as a bell-shaped line (see Figure 2 for
an example of total compensation).

Figure 2. A histogram of the criterion variable of total compensation.
Data distribution of the criterion variable was severely skewed to the right. The
peak values were on the left side of the mean value, while the standard deviation value
was high. In other words, most of the CEOs’ total compensation (approximately 70%)
was relatively much lower than that of the rest of the CEOs in the sample. Very few
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CEOs (four out of 126) had much higher total compensation than others. Therefore, the
sample data violated the parametric assumption of data being normally distributed.
In the case of any violations of parametric assumptions, the researcher must
resolve such issues before starting any data analysis (Pallant, 2016). Pallant further
suggested that transforming variables might help in better meeting the parametric
assumptions. I used the following logarithmic transformation on all variables.
total_compensation_log = log10(total_compensation)

(1)

revenue_log = log10(revenue)

(2)

ROE_log = log10(ROE)

(3)

where total_compensation_log, revenue_log, and ROE_log were newly
transformed variables, which were the logarithm to the base 10 (common logarithm) of
old variables (total_compensation, revenue, and ROE). After the variable transformation
process, I carried out the planned procedure to test the following assumptions by
exploring the relevant calculations and graphs.
Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity was one of the potential limitations of the
study because the calculation of both ROE and revenue had a relation to net income.
Specifically, ROE was the quotient of net income and shareholders’ equity, while net
income could be the difference of revenues and total expenses. Winship and Western
(2016) explained that multicollinearity (or, having auto-correlated predictor variables) in
a regression model could cause problems by introducing large standard errors that impact
the power of the test. However, the scatterplot between the logarithm of revenue and the
logarithm of ROE showed no linear relationship (see Figure 3).

90

Figure 3. Scatterplot of the transformed predictor variables..
The predictor variables (ROE_log and revenue_log) were not noticeably
correlated because the scatterplot did not show a linear pattern. As well, the Pearson’s
correlation coefficient between the predictor variables was .386, which represented a
small bivariate correlation level. I also evaluated values of tolerance and the variance
inflation factor (VIF) from the collinearity statistics, which were within the acceptable
range of tolerance >.10 and VIF < 10 (see Table 2). Hence, the logarithmic model met the
assumption of multicollinearity.
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Table 2
Collinearity Statistics
Model

Variable
Tolerance

1

(Constant)
Revenue_log
ROE_log

.851
.851

Collinearity statistics
VIF
1.175
1.175

Outliers. Outliers are also an important aspect that a researcher needs to check
and possibly remove. Pallant (2016) suggested inspecting the boxplot or Mahalanobis
distances for detecting outliers. A boxplot indicated that outliers were problematic with a
separate data point presented (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. A boxplot shows the outlier..
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The rectangle in the boxplot represented the distribution of most sample data. The line in
the middle of the rectangle indicated the median value. The bars on the top and bottom of
the rectangle leveled to the maximum and minimum values, respectively. However, the
additional circle above the maximum value was an outlier. Based upon the number of
predictor variables, I also checked the saved Mahalanobis distances in the data file for
any critical chi-square value exceeding 13.82. Based on this review, I removed two
observations separately from a total of 126 for final analysis. After a reassessment, the
model had no additional outliers.
Normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity are other fundamental assumptions of linear regression analyses.
Pallant (2016) expounded that these assumptions could reveal the underlying relationship
between variables. Pallant further advocated using different plots of standardized
residuals for checking assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.
Presented at the end of the analytical output, the normal plot (P-P) of regression
standardized residual demonstrated no major deviation from normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. The normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual. Data points of
actual values and predicted values in the normal P-P plot formed a relatively straight
diagonal line.
Residuals are differences between actual values and predicted values, which
should be normally distributed (Pallant, 2016). A histogram of standardized residuals also
indicated the normal distribution of sample data (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. The histogram of regression standardized residual.. Standardized residuals of
the criterion variable were mostly within a bell-shaped line.
Pallant (2016) emphasized the need for checking the depiction of scatterplot and
the maximum value of Cook's distances to be smaller than 1 (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. The scatterplot of regression standardized residual. .
The scatterplot of standardized residuals did not delineate any clear and systematic
patterns. The maximum value of Cook’s distance of .065 also confirmed that no major
problem existed in the predictive model. Therefore, I did not identify any violation to
assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics provide summarized values of variables, such as mean and
standard deviation. Pallant (2016) advised to always check for descriptive statistics to see
if values make sense. I utilized a total of 124 observations for the analysis, using the
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respective logarithms of CEO’s total compensation, revenue, and ROE as variables.
Table 3 included the descriptive statistics of variables in the study, where the standard
deviation of each variable was not reasonably high.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Transformed Variables
Variable
Total_compensation_log
Revenue_log
ROE_log

Mean
6.2896
8.9621
1.0158

Standard deviation
.36705
.63959
.32054

N
124
124
124

Inferential Results
In the final model, I invoked the standard multiple linear regression procedures,
α=.05 (two-tailed), to examine the efficacy of ROE and revenue in predicting CEO’s total
compensation. The predictor variables were ROE of the firm and annual revenues of the
firm. The criterion variable was CEO’s total compensation. The null hypothesis was that
a significant predictive relationship did not exist between ROE, annual revenue, and
CEO’s total compensation. The alternative hypothesis was that a significant predictive
relationship existed between ROE, annual revenue, and CEO’s total compensation.
Results of preliminary data analyses revealed violations to parametric
assumptions. However, the variable transformation technique was in place to combat the
influence of assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity; the transformed
model had no serious violations identified (see Tests of Assumptions). The model as a
whole was able to significantly predict CEO’s total compensation, F (2, 121) = 95.691, p
< .000. The correlation coefficient was .783, indicating that approximately 61% of
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variations in the logarithm of CEO’s total compensation was attributed to the linear
combination of predictor variables (logarithms of ROE and annual revenue).
Despite the fact that a combination of ROE and annual revenue were statistically
significant to the total compensation, annual revenue alone (t = 12.714, p < .000)
accounted for the contribution to the whole model. ROE did not explain any significant
variation in CEO’s total compensation (t = .124, p > .05). Standardized coefficients of the
model also explained that annual revenue contributed vastly more than ROE in the model
(see Table 4 for model summary and coefficients).
Table 4
Model Summary and Coefficients for Standard Multiple Regression.

Variable

Unstandardized
coefficients
B
SE

Standardized
coefficients
Beta

t

Model 1

Sig.
.000

(Constant)

.000

2.27
.296
7.669
0
Revenue_log
.447
.035
.780
12.714
ROE_log
.009
.070
.008
.124
Note. N = 124; criterion variable = total_compensation_log.

R2
.613

ΔR2
.606

.000
.901

The final predictive equation was:
log10 Y (Total compensation) = β0 + β1*log10 (Revenue) + β2* log10 (ROE)

(4)

or,
Y (Total compensation) = 10 β0*(Revenue) β1*(ROE) β2

(5)

where β0 was the constant and βi was the coefficient for unstandardized coefficient
of each predictor variable. Taking an example, the CEO’s total compensation should be
close to $5952446.66, given Y = 10 2.270 * ($10317361000) .447 * (12.89) .009.
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Tarasova and Tarasov (2016) stated that elasticity showed the relative change of
an index under the influence of the change of another index, while the other indexes were
holding as constants. To transform the above equation further by differentiating it, β1 and
β2 were the elasticity of total compensation to revenue and ROE respectively (see Figure
8).

β1 =

%∆

%∆

; β2 =

%∆

%∆

Figure 8. The elasticity in the criterion variable and the predictor variables. β1 and β2
represented the percentage change of the total compensation with respect to percentage
changes of revenue and ROE individually.
Revenue. The coefficient for revenue (.447) as a predictor of total compensation
indicated that approximately a 44.7% increase in CEO’s total compensation for every 1%
increase in annual revenues of the firm. In other words, CEO’s total compensation tended
to increase dramatically as annual revenues of the firm increased. Standardized
coefficient for revenue (.780) indicated that revenue contributed far more than ROE did
(standardized coefficient = .008) in the predictive model (see Table 4).
Return on equity. The coefficient for ROE (.009) as a predictor of total
compensation indicated an almost 1% increase in CEO’s total compensation for every 1%
increase in ROE of the firm. In other words, the change in ROE of the firm had minimal
impact on the change in CEO’s total compensation. Table 4 is the regression summary
table.

99
Additionally, Pallant (2016) expounded that the adjusted R2 (ΔR2) from the output
involved steps of taking the number of variables and the sample size into consideration.
Given the adjusted R2 (.606) was in the close range of the R2 (.613), the regression model
was relatively reliable (see Table 4). However, Daderman and Basinska (2016) suggested
cross-validating the model by reporting the adjusted R2 from the calculation of Stein's
formula (see Figure 9), which predicts the generalizability of the regression model to a
different sample from the same population.
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Figure 9. Stein’s formula.
The adjusted R2 could also be a result of the calculation involving the number of
participants (n) and the number of predictors (k). Incorporating values of n and k into the
equation, the result of such a calculation was the adjusted R2 = .597, compared to the R2
of the model at .613, which indicated good generalizability.
Analysis summary. The purpose of this study was to examine the predictive
relationship between ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation. I used multiple linear regression to examine the ability of ROE and annual
revenue to predict the value of CEO’s total compensation, using the logarithmically
transformed variables. The assessment of assumptions of multiple linear regression was
successful because the transformation of variables and removing outliers enhanced the
model. The logarithmic model could significantly predict CEO’s total compensation, F
(2, 121) = 95.691, p < .000, R2 = .613. The conclusion from this analysis was that ROE of
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firms and annual revenues of firms had an association with CEOs’ total compensation. In
particular, annual revenues of firms were sensitive to CEOs’ total compensation.
Theoretical conversation on findings. Based on the results of data analysis, I
rejected the null hypothesis that a significant predictive relationship did not exist between
ROE of firms, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total compensation. ROE and annual
revenues of firms significantly predicted CEOs’ total compensation among U.S. publicly
traded commercial banks. Such a finding conformed to the supposition of agency theory,
which explained the principal-agent relationship. Annual revenue (annual sales) is one of
the simple indicators of financial performance of a firm, while CEO’s compensation is
the representation of the agent’s interest in the business context. Feng et al. (2017) found
that annual revenue was a more manageable ratio of growth of a firm. A predictive
relationship between performance of a firm and CEO’s compensation meant that both the
principal’s interests and the agent’s interests were aligned.
Unlike annual revenue, ROE of a firm is a more complex measurement on profits;
ROE incorporates debts and net income into the equation. Therefore, ROE of a firm
might be more difficult for predicting a CEO’s compensation. Ahsan (2013) argued that
ROE was the figure with manipulability, which might have flaws in measuring
performance of a firm. Overall, findings of this study dovetailed with Nulla (2013a)’s
study, where the relationship between financial performance of a firm and CEO’s
compensation existed.
These findings echo those of Moore (2014)’s research for the U.S. health
insurance industry, in which annual revenue of a firm was a dominating factor in

101
predicting CEO’s total compensation. Banker et al. (2013) also found a negative
relationship between performance of a firm, measured by ROE and CEO’s compensation
using data from 1993 to 2006. However, compensation committees should consider
different varieties of performance measurement, regarding building an effective CEO
incentive plan.
Applications to Professional Practice
The results of this study can help BODs to understand the use of different types of
incentives (bonuses, stock awards, option awards, and so on) for compensating CEOs,
which should align with financial performance of their firms. Lin et al. (2013) found that
misaligned relationship between CEO’s compensation and performance of the firm
existed in some industries. Hence, compensation committees in the banking industry
should continue to keep the aligned relationship between CEOs’ compensation and
performance of the firm. Obtaining a statistically significant model could allow for a
competitive total compensation structure within the industry.
Business practices in different industries may vary. The results of this study
enhanced the known knowledge about the relationship between performance of the firm
and CEO’s compensation in the U.S. banking industry. ROE is one of the most common
measurements of performance in the banking industry (Klaassen & van Eeghen, 2015).
However, Klaassen and van Eeghen further asserted that ROE is a short-term
measurement that omits risks. Having obtained knowledge of a specific industry,
compensation committees will be able to develop an efficient CEO’s compensation
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structure, which reflects the percentage changes in ROE, annual revenue, and CEO’s
compensation, to balance the performance of the firm with CEO’s incentives.
Based on findings of the regression model, annual revenue and ROE of firms had
a significant predictive relationship to CEOs’ total compensation. Bennett, Bettis,
Gopalan, and Milbourn (2017) argued that benchmarking performance-based components
in the compensation package would be a good business practice for evaluating the
strategy of CEOs’ compensation structure. Business leaders could utilize the regression
formula to measure if their CEOs currently have proper compensation for the
performance of the firm, or to determine their compensation for the future.
Implications for Social Change
The general public demand a pay raise due to a high inflation rate. As well, the
rapid growth of CEOs’ compensation has drawn much of public attentions (Gopalan,
Milbourn, Song, & Thakor, 2014). Individuals’ concern on the unfairness of wealth
distribution or the significance of income inequity has been widely persistent in society
(Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014). The contribution to social change of this study involved
having individuals in societies understand the rationale for why CEOs’ and the average
employees’ compensation have some disparities, as well as the public perception on how
performance of firms correlates to their CEOs’ total compensation. Additionally, the
growth of CEOs’ compensation must be tied to performance of firms (Abraham, Harris,
& Auerbach, 2014). Using the results of this study, stakeholders of firms might also
acquire an understanding of the importance of how to award impartial compensation
packages to CEOs.
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Recommendations for Action
Financial performance of firms had a positive influence on their CEOs’ total
compensation among U.S. commercial banks. Such a finding coincided with the results
of research in other industries (Moore, 2014; Nulla, 2013b). Compensation committees of
U.S. banking firms should pay attention to this study and could use the findings of the
study to evaluate their current CEO compensation packages and fine-tune their
compensation plans accordingly. Specifically, compensation committees need to perform
periodic reviews of statistical relationship on total compensation of CEOs, using revenue
as one source of data to represent performance of the firm. However, compensation
committees can only use ROE to evaluate a limited statistical relationship. By doing these
reviews, BODs may record the risks for any tangible discrepancies of mismatched CEO’s
compensation to performance of the firm. BODs should further initiate remedial actions
based on these findings.
Besides compensation committees and BODs, potential audiences of this study
are scholars and investors. Scholars may use results of the study for considering further
research on performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. Investors can rely on careful
analysis of data or evidence from the research to make their investment decisions
(Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul, 2015). Therefore, I will publish the final version
of the study in the ProQuest dissertations database; or submit a refined version to
economics-related journals. Using these publications, I thereby disseminate findings of
this study to other scholars. Furthermore, results of the study may also be available to
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investors in appropriate forums of professional gatherings, such as conferences or
workshops on economics, finance, and management.
Recommendations for Further Research
I only used data from the past 6 years in this study. Enlarging the sample size in
the future research could also improve generalizability of results (Nuzzo, 2016). Further
studies into the relationship between financial performance of firms and CEOs’
compensation within the U.S. banking industry could focus on the examination of data
from a more extended period. Abraham et al. (2014) suggested structuring a sample
within a single industry, which might have specific characteristics to impact CEOs’
compensation.
Further studies could also cover the population in other industries. Annual
revenue and ROE are potentially auto-correlated. Pallant (2016) pointed out that the
existence of multicollinearity would jeopardize the regression model. To address the
limitation of this study, I suggest using different variables that measure performance of
the firm, such as the stock price, current ratio, or cash flow. Additionally, future studies
may include other types of variables that might affect CEO’s compensation or
performance of the firm, such as total assets of the firm or interest rates.
Reflections
Overall, the research process has been a challenging and exciting experience. To
address the data assumption and maintain the power of statistical testing, I had to
transform all the originally proposed variables into forms of the logarithm, as well as to
reduce the sample size from 126 to 124. However, the preemptive expectations did not
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impact results of the study because the transformed variables demonstrated a strong fit
for the model. Even though the results showed a predictive relationship existed between
the financial performance of U.S. banking firms and CEOs’ total compensation, the
results of the study surprised me that ROEs alone did not have the positive relationship to
CEOs’ total compensation.
During the proposal stage, I expected that the predictive relationship between
financial performance of U.S. banking firms and CEOs’ compensation would exist.
Specifically, I expected both annual revenue and ROE would predict CEOs’ total
compensation. However, little doubt on the existence of such a relationship started to
emerge during the literature review phase, which motivated me to continue the research.
Although I had the basic statistical skills before engaging in the data analysis, I improved
my skills of regression data analysis and extended my knowledge of quantitative
research. Furthermore, the research process required extensive time for planning,
implementation, and iteration. I have greatly benefited from such an experience by
improving the time-management skills, both on professional and personal levels.
Conclusion
The main finding of this study showed that a significant predictive relationship
exists between the financial performance of firms and CEOs’ total compensation. Such a
finding was in favor of the argument from agency theory. However, the finding was
limited to one aspect of the performance of firms: the measure of annual revenues. The
response of compensation to the proportional changes in annual revenues was much more
definitive than in ROE. Compensation committees should continue to maintain and
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improve CEOs’ incentives to ensure the proper alignment between performance of the
firm and CEOs’ compensation.
Previous studies focused on examination of the relationship between financial
performance of firms and CEOs’ compensation. These studies, such as those by Lin et al.
(2013), Nulla (2013a), Nulla (2013b), and Moore (2014) yielded controversial results.
However, studies in the banking industry were rare. According to agency theory, aligning
performance of the firm with CEO’s compensation is imperative because CEOs (act as
agents of firms) may have conflicting interests to those of owners of firms (the principal;
Mitnick, 2015). Using a standard multiple linear regression, I performed data analysis on
a sample data set to answer the research question of whether a significant predictive
relationship existed between ROE, annual revenues of firms, and CEOs’ total
compensation in the U.S. banking industry. From the results of data analysis, I found that
annual revenue was the dominating factor in predicting the total compensation.
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Appendix A: Frequency and Percentage of Total Sources
This study includes a total of 222 references, of which 212 articles (95.5%) are
from peer-reviewed journals and six articles (2.7%) are from non-peer-reviewed journals.
Two books and two dissertations, representing 0.9% of total sources, respectively, are
also included. The total number of sources published within 5 years is 210, which
accounts for 94.6% of all sources. Of the articles used in the study, 201 were published in
peer-review journals within the past 5 years, which represents 90.5% of total sources.
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Appendix B: Statement Regarding Data Collection
Walden University’s directive states that researchers are required to obtain IRB
approval before collection of any data. I used publicly available archival data for the
study after obtaining IRB approval. To collect such data prior to IRB approval, as
indicated by the DBA rubric, would be a direct violation of Walden University’s IRB
policy.
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Appendix C: Statement Regarding Permissions for Data and Instrumentation
The study involved analysis of archival data from databases and annual reports
that were publicly available. I did not need to obtain permissions for collecting data
because the datasets were not proprietary and there were no human participants in the
process. Additionally, I used raw archival data for analysis; therefore, permission related
to instrumentation was not needed.
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